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Article 2

In Search of the Probate Exception
James E. Pfander*
Michael J.T. Downey**
As a limit on the power of Article III courts, the probate exception has
surely earned its place in the old curiosity shop of federal jurisdictionallaw.
Dating from the early nineteenth century, the exception has been said to derive
from various sources, including the lack of federal jurisdiction over
ecclesiastical matters, the "law" and "equity" limits of Article III, and the
structure of our federal government. The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in
Marshall v. Marshall sought to clarify matters, but lower courts continue to
debate the breadth of the exception.
In this Article, we go in search of the probate exception. After
concluding that some familiar arguments do not persuasively justify a gap in
federal judicial power, we consider Article III's case-or-controversy
requirement. Understood as requiring live disputes between adverse parties,
the case-or-controversy requirement might appear to rule out much of the
unconstested ex parte or administrative work commonly conducted in the
course of probate proceedings. Yet the federal courts have a long tradition of
hearing administrativematters, from the naturalizationpetitions that arrived
on federal dockets in 1790 to the bankruptcyproceedings that unfold each day
in the Article III judiciary. Even today, Article III courts entertain
applications for ISA warrants on an ex parte basis and conduct ex parte
inquiries into applicationsfor the entry of default judgments. Like many civil
law tribunals, in short, the courts of the United States exercise what in Roman
law was referred to as "contentious"and "noncontentious"jurisdiction.
Although the tradition of noncontentious federal jurisdiction cannot
easily coexist with some broad statements of Article III's supposedly inflexible
adverse-party requirement, we think the best way to harmonize adversary
rhetoric and noncontentious reality lies in the distinction between cases and
Owen L. Coon Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, magna cum laude; B.A, Northwestern
University.
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Adam Hirsch, John Langbein, Max Schanzenbach, Rob Sitkoff, and Suzanna Sherry for
comments on an early draft.
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controversies. We believe Article III permits the federal courts to administer
the law only when the ex parte claim being assertedpresents a "case" under
federal law. At the same time, we think the Constitution requiresfull adverseparty disputes in all "controversies"governed by state law. On that view,
federal courts lack the power to entertain stand-alone ex parte applicationsfor
probate so long as they remain creatures of state law. Federal involvement in
state law matters requires a "controversy."But, if Congress were to federalize
the law of decedents' trusts and estates with the exercise of an appropriate
source of federal power, Article III courts could hear petitions for the probate
of federal wills as "cases"within the judicialpower.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the enigmas of federal jurisdiction, the probate
exception surely ranks with the most arcane. In simple terms, the
exception operates to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over certain
probate matters, even those that would otherwise qualify for federal
jurisdiction. But the exception rarely stays so simple. No less
knowledgeable a figure than Richard Posner has described the
exception as "one of the most mysterious and esoteric branches of the
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law of federal jurisdiction," and many scholars, jurists, and
practitioners would agree. We hope to contribute to this Symposium's
exploration of the role of federal law and federal institutions in private
wealth transfer by dispelling some of the uncertainty that surrounds
the probate exception.
One kind of uncertainty surrounds the exception's origins.
Some scholars deny the very existence of the exception, portraying it
as an outgrowth of a series of doctrines rather than a single coherent
limit on federal judicial power. 2 Others treat the exception as a fairly
modest restriction on the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to
the lower federal courts.3 Still others regard the exception as one of
constitutional dimension. On one such constitutional theory (espoused
by Justice Holmes, among others), the omission of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction from Article III debars the federal courts from performing
the probate chores that the English church courts had performed. 4 A
second theory holds that the case-and-controversy requirement of
Article III forbids the probate of wills, at least in the absence of a
contest between adverse parties. 5

1.

Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).

2.

See, e.g., John F. Winkler, The Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB.

L.J. 77, 78 (1997):
[T]he existence of a 'probate exception' to federal jurisdiction is a myth of federal law.
Actions to obtain decedents' property or damages in lieu of such property should not
be subject to any special principles of federal jurisdiction. Certain limits that apply
generally to federal jurisdiction, however, often will restrict such actions.
3.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 306-08 (2006) (linking the probate
exception to the Judiciary Act of 1789).
4.
The probate exception shares something in common with the domestic relations
exception, which has been said to forbid the federal courts from hearing suits for divorce and
alimony. Id. ("Like the domestic relations exception, the probate exception has been linked to
language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789."). For the Court's latest narrowing restatement
of the domestic relations exception, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)
(reading the exception to block suits brought in diversity for divorce, alimony and child support).
For a similar narrowing treatment of the probate exception, see Marshall, 547 U.S. at 306
(limiting the probate exception to the admission of wills to probate, and the administration of
probate estates). Both exceptions have been linked to the omission of ecclesiastical matters from
Article III, and it was to this omission that Justice Holmes adverted. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici v.
Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) (Holmes, J.) (concluding that federal jurisdiction over
disputes involving vice consuls appointed by a foreign nation did not include suits for divorce or
alimony; consular suits "must be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to include
what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts"); see also infra text
accompanying note 163 (quoting Justice Story's view that the probate of wills was a matter of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction).
5.
See, e.g., Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883) (contrasting ex parte and "merely
administrative" probate proceedings that fall outside "the judicial power . . . of the United
States" with probate disputes that properly invoke federal jurisdiction "to settle a controversy");
Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.) (observing

1536

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:6:1533

A second source of uncertainty grows out of the Supreme
Court's efforts, diligent if not always elegant, to cabin the probate
exception (and its fraternal twin, the domestic relations exception).6
The Court has done so in a series of decisions that treat the exception
as having grown out of the narrow language of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which conferred jurisdiction over "suits" in "law or in equity"
between diverse parties. 7 English courts of "equity" were thought to
have stayed out of ecclesiastical matters: they did not admit wills to
probate, did not appoint personal representatives or executors to
manage the assets of the estate, and did not oversee and approve the
formal distribution of the probate estate) As a consequence,
nineteenth century federal courts clothed with the powers of English
courts of equity traditionally declined to perform these chores as well
when exercising their diversity jurisdiction.9 While federal courts were
free to entertain inter partes claims by heirs, creditors, and legatees,
they lacked authority to hear in rem probate proceedings. 10
that the "uncontested probate of a will" and "uncontested appointment of a guardian" are not
cases or controversies within the meaning of Article III").
6.

See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS

AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 173 (6th ed. 2009) (addressing both exceptions in a single short
section of the casebook). Ecclesiastical courts in England handled both probate and domestic
relations proceedings.
7.
Judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73; see Marshall, 547 U.S. at 306-08 (citing
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)). The Court used a similar interpretive move to
restrict the scope of the domestic relations exception. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 695-97
(declaring the domestic relations exception a product of statutory interpretation, rather than
constitutional compulsion).
8.
Although the High Court of Chancery in England lacked formal power to admit wills to
probate or to appoint administrators and executors, Chancery exercised broad authority over
decedents' trusts and estates. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625-29

(A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed., rev. 1956) ("The ecclesiastical courts obtained
jurisdiction over grants of Probate and Administration, and, to a certain degree, over the conduct
of the executor and the administrator. All these branches of their jurisdiction could be exercised
only over personal estate."); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS

ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

§§

802, 809 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918). See

generally Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1503-14 (2001) (chronicling Chancery's
power over decedents' trusts, fraud claims, suits seeking discovery, and the administration of
estates to protect heirs, creditors, and legatees).
9.
Compare Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. 1, 43-50 (1819) (basing a
narrow view of federal equity power on perceived historical limits on equity power in England),
with Vidal v. Girards Ex'rs, 43 U.S. 127, 194-96 (1844) (concluding that broader powers were
available in England and should thus be available to federal courts of equity as well). The
Court's decision to treat the exception as a matter of interpreting the diversity statute nicely
avoids making the scope of the exception dependent on research into the eighteenth century
practice of the High Court of Chancery in England.
10. See, e.g., Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 10 (1875):
Federal courts have no probate jurisdiction, referring particularly to the
establishment of wills; and such is undoubtedly the case under the existing legislation
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The Court's most recent decision, Marshall v. Marshall, nicely
the
probate
struggle
to narrow
illustrates
its ongoing
exception." Although the dispute in question grew out of the estate
plans of a wealthy Texas decedent, the plaintiff was not asking a
federal court to admit a will to probate, to administer an estate, or to
wrest control of an estate from state court. 12 Instead, the plaintiff
sought damages in tort for interference with a prospective gift, an in
personam action "at law" that did not threaten to interfere with the
state probate proceeding.13 By concluding that the tort claim did not
implicate the probate exception, the Court reaffirmed a narrow view of
the exception and ducked the looming question-whether the
exception applies to matters brought in federal court pursuant to
federal bankruptcy or other grants of federal question jurisdiction. 14
While the decision signals the Court's continuing adherence to
what it termed a "distinctly limited" view of the probate exception, 15
Marshall leaves ample room for further discussion. Subsequent lower
court decisions, for example, reveal a thriving debate over the breadth
of the exception. Thus, the federal courts have refused to consider an
application for an order compelling payment from a trust fund 16 and
have blocked the adjudication of a dispute over attorney's fees payable
in a probate proceeding. 17 On the other hand, the federal courts have
agreed to hear suits that would, if successful, deplete the limited
assets of a living trust18 or expand a decedent's estate by adding
assets to it.19 At the same time, one federal court used Marshall to
of Congress. The reason lies in the nature of the proceeding to probate a will as one in
rem, which does not necessarily involve any controversy between parties.
11.
See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 306-12 (analyzing cases that dealt with the probate
exception and the domestic relations exception).
12. Id. at 312.
13. Id. Inter partes claims between diverse parties, even those large enough to deplete the
entire estate, have long been cognizable in federal court, notwithstanding the probate exception.
See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 492, 494 (1946). For doubts about the wisdom of
recognizing tortious interference claims of the kind at issue in Marshall, see John C.P. Goldberg

& Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65
STAN. L. REV. 335, 338-40, 365-97 (2013).
14. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308-09 (disclaiming any need to decide if the bankruptcy
statute included a probate exception comparable to that associated with the diversity statute).
15. Id. at 310-12.
16. Kennedy v. Trs. of the Testamentary Trust, 406 F. App'x 507, 509-10 (2d Cir. 2010).
17.
Bedree v. Bedree, 396 F. App'x 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Legal fees are costs of
administering the estate, and thus, if the district court weighs in on the propriety of these fees it
would improperly intrude into administration of the estate." (citation omitted)).
18. See Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that assets in
a living trust generally avoid probate because the assets are owned by the trust, not the
decedent).
19. See, e.g., Gustafson v. zumBrunnen, 546 F.3d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 2008):
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neutralize the probate exception but nevertheless declined to hear the
matter under the Colorado River abstention doctrine. 20
Apart from the judicial debate over the exception's breadth,
conceptual problems linger. So long as the probate exception rests on
a historically informed understanding of the power of English courts of
law and equity, the Court will face questions about the scope of the
exception. To begin with, Article III itself confers judicial power in
terms of law and equity, 21 thus lending color to the argument that the
probate exception has constitutional roots in the omission of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Moreover, the law-and-equity formulation
on which the Court has based its diversity interpretation also
undergirds the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction. As
Judge Posner has observed, the Court's proffered justification for
excluding probate matters from the diversity docket would appear to
apply with equal force to matters within the district court's federal
question jurisdiction.22
In this Article, we go in search of the probate exception,
drawing on standard modes of legal analysis and interpretation. We
begin in Part II with a critical analysis of the theories that purport to
explain why Article III of the Constitution may exclude probate
matters from federal court. For reasons having to do with the text,
structure, and history of the judicial article, we reject these theories
and construct an alternative account. We focus in particular on the
meaning of the terms "cases" and "controversies" in Article III. The
Supreme Court has blended those two terms in concluding that Article
III limits federal courts to the adjudication of disputes between
adverse parties with concrete opposing interests. This adverse-party
requirement can partly explain the probate exception; as we will see,
many probate proceedings begin with uncontested submissions for the
admission of wills to probate and for the appointment of executors.
The suit, though based ultimately on the will, is not within the probate exception to
federal jurisdiction. The judgment sought would just add assets to the decedent's
estate; it would not reallocate the estate's assets among contending claimants or
otherwise interfere with the probate court's control over and administration of the
estate.
20. See Jimenez v. Rodriguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 24, 27-32 (1st Cir. 2010) (reasoning the
case did not fall within the limited scope of the probate exception, but it did, however, require
abstention by the federal court due to the Colorado River abstention doctrine).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power of the United States to "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority").
22. See Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (noting that the
probate exception was well established in federal law when Congress in 1875 granted
jurisdiction over any suit in law and equity arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of
the United States).
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Such uncontested submissions do not present a "controversy" within
the meaning of Article III and thus lie beyond federal judicial power.
At the same time, drawing on separate work on the power of
Article III courts to exercise noncontentious jurisdiction in federal
question "cases," we show that the adverse-party requirement does not
apply across the board. Federal courts have long been given, and have
agreed to accept, jurisdiction over ex parte proceedings, such as
applications for naturalization, benefit claims, applications for
warrants, and various uncontested bankruptcy matters. 23 In agreeing
to hear such noncontentious matters, the federal courts administer
federal law in much the same way state courts administer state law in
connection with probate proceedings. We think the source of
underlying law plays a crucial role in defining the scope of the federal
courts' noncontentious jurisdiction. Article III extends judicial power
only to "controversies" or "disputes" between adversaries on state law
matters and thus forecloses noncontentious jurisdiction. 2 4 But the
definition of "cases" extends more broadly to encompass any claim of
right based on federal law. We therefore conclude that Congress could
assign probate administration to the federal courts in connection with
otherwise constitutionally proper federal legislation that regulated,
say, the commercial implications of estates with ties to more than one
state or implemented estate-related treaties with foreign countries. 25
So long as state law governs probate, however, the federal courts lack
power to administer the law in ex parte proceedings and cannot hear
common form probate petitions that rest on state law.

23.
See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript
at 15, 20-26) (unpublished draft on file with authors) (listing applications for search and FISA
warrants, uncontested bankruptcy proceedings, and subpoenas, among others, as proceedings
that lack adverse parties).
24. Id. (manuscript at 5) ("We suggest that the answer lies in recognizing that federal
courts may constitutionally exercise not one but two kinds of judicial power: power to resolve
disputes between adverse parties and power to entertain applications from parties seeking to
register or claim a legal interest under a federal statute.").
25. Our preference for Commerce Clause agnosticism stems from the highly contested
contours of that source of federal power. See generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(disclosing a sharp division on the Court as to the scope of the commerce power). Still, the Court
has continued to adhere to the view that " '[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is
not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states,' but extends to activities that 'have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce' " as well as activities that substantially affect
commerce "only when aggregated with similar activities of others." Id. at 2585-86 (Roberts, C.J.)
(quoting United States v. Darby 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941)). To the extent Congress were to
make findings as to the impact of large estates on interstate commerce, and were to focus on
estates with assets in more than one jurisdiction, one could argue that Congress was regulating
matters "in" interstate commerce as well as matters with a substantial effect on such commerce.
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Part III of the Article turns from constitutional to statutory
issues, focusing on how the probate exception came to be embedded in
the law of federal jurisdiction. The historical story begins with some
background on the superior courts of law and equity in England and
the separation of their work from that of the church courts, which bore
primary (but not exclusive) responsibility for probate matters. We also
examine early practice in the state and federal courts. While a variety
of currents run through the Supreme Court's decisional law, we find
surprisingly substantial support for our claims about the origins and
nature of the probate exception. Indeed, during the nineteenth
century, the Court itself suggested that the absence of a controversy
created the exception but that federal power extends to all
controversies, even those that grow out of probate proceedings. 26
Part IV briefly considers the modern scope of the probate
exception. While we have identified a constitutional predicate for the
probate exception based on the inability of the federal courts to
entertain ex parte or uncontested proceedings on matters governed by
state law, that narrow exception has little prospect of informing the
content of current law. It nonetheless bears noting that our approach
represents a small but potentially significant departure from the
Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Marshall, which defined the
exception in statutory rather than constitutional terms. 27 Moreover,
the Marshall Court took a slightly broader view of the scope of the
exception than do we, ruling out federal jurisdiction over suits to
"annul a will," 28 despite the fact that such litigation would present an
inter partes dispute of the kind that would seemingly satisfy the
"controversy" requirement of Article 111.29 Our view of congressional
power could prove significant in two settings: if Congress were
inclined to broaden federal diversity jurisdiction by including all inter
partes probate disputes between citizens of different states, we see no
constitutional objection. Similarly, if Congress were inclined to
26. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883):
Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included in nor excepted
out of the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United States. So far as it is ex
parte and merely administrative, it is not conferred and cannot be exercised by them
at all until, in a case at law or in equity, its exercise becomes necessary to settle a
controversy of which a court of the United States may take cognizance by reason of
the citizenship of the parties.
27.
Marshallv. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307-08 (2006).
28. Id. at 311-12 (treating actions to probate or annul a will as well as those that would
reach a res in the custody of state court as falling within modern definitions of the probate
exception).
29. See id. at 317 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 22 (1876), for the proposition that federal courts have power to
entertain disputes over the proposed annulment of a will).
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federalize probate and assign uncontested matters to the federal
courts, we find nothing in Article III that would bar the way.
II. EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON FEDERAL
PROBATE JURISDICTION

Scholars and jurists have advanced three separate arguments
that the Constitution itself forbids the federal courts from exercising
probate jurisdiction. First, some contend that Article III permits the
federal courts to proceed only in law and equity, thus implicitly ruling
out probate proceedings on the ground that they were grist for the
English ecclesiastical courts. 30 Second, some posit a federalism-based
limit on the exercise of jurisdiction over probate matters. 31 Third,
some contend that Article III extends only to cases and controversies,
thereby foreclosing the federal courts from hearing ex parte
(nonadverse) petitions for the initiation of probate proceedings.
Relatedly, the case - and-controversy requirement may appear
inconsistent with certain administrative chores associated with
appointing and overseeing the work of the estate's personal
representative. 32 We evaluate these arguments in turn.

A. Cases in Law and Equity
In exploring the limits of law and equity, we begin with the
well-known terms of Article III, which extend the judicial power of the
United States to a variety of cases and controversies. 33 The law and
equity qualification, however, applies only to cases arising under
federal law. The relevant provision extends judicial power to "all
30. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) (voicing the view that
the ecclesiastical nature of probate jurisdiction foreclosed federal courts of law and equity from
entertaining such matters). For an account of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in early modern England,
see infra Part III.B.
31.
See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962).
32.
Convention holds, perhaps incorrectly, that the federal courts cannot administer the
law in ex parte proceedings, but may only entertain cases and controversies. For an account, see
Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy
Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 548 (2006)
(arguing that Article III limits the federal courts to the adjudication of disputes between adverse
parties and forecloses non-adverse proceedings, such as settlement class actions). On the
application of this idea in the probate context, see Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883)
(explaining that probate matters "ex parte and merely administrative" cannot be entertained by
federal courts until it becomes "necessary to settle a controversy ... [between diverse citizens]").
33. For background on the framing of the judicial article of the Constitution, see JAMES E.
PFANDER, ONE SUPREME COURT: SUPREMACY, INFERIORITY, AND THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE

UNITED STATES (2009); see also Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985).
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Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority." 34 The remaining grants include no such "law
and equity" qualification; Article III simply extends the judicial power
to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"; to "all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls"; and to a
variety of "Controversies" defined by the alignment of parties,
including disputes between "Citizens of different States." 35
The argument for reading this extension of judicial power as an
implicit exclusion of probate authority has both textual and historical
elements. First, drawing on the historical structure of the courts of
England, the argument regards the head of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
as a source of judicial power separate from law and equity. England
assigned judicial authority to a wide range of separate courts: the
superior courts of Westminster Hall included two common law
tribunals (King's Bench and Common Pleas), one equitable tribunal
(the High Court of Chancery), and one tribunal of mixed law and
equity parentage (the Court of Exchequer). 36 In addition to these
courts of law and equity, the High Court of Admiralty presided over
cases of prize and capture; the military courts enforced military
discipline; and the ecclesiastical courts handled matters of faith and
communion with the Church of England. 37 While King's Bench
deployed supervisory writs, including mandamus, habeas corpus, and
prohibition, to oversee the work of the Admiralty and ecclesiastical
34.
35.
36.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Id.
For an overview of the structure of the English court system in the eighteenth century,

see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 194-264, 446-76; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.

The fourth superior court, the Court of Exchequer, entertained both revenue matters and cases
at common law and in equity and sat in a space adjoining Westminster Hall.
37.
The high courts of admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction sat together at Doctor's
Commons in London and applied canon law and procedure in the determination of disputes. See
1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 547, 562, 573, 594-95. The proctors (or lawyers) who appeared
for the parties to these matters were similarly learned in the canon law, and many would have
studied at the great English universities, where Roman canon law (rather than the common law
of England) was the focus of instruction. For a useful summary of ecclesiastical practice in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL REPORTS MADE TO
HIS MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE PRACTICE AND
JURISDICTION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES (London et al. eds. 1832)

[hereinafter COMMISSIONERS' REPORT] (describing in detail the jurisdiction and practice of the
ecclesiastical courts and suggesting reforms to improve efficiency). On the influence of Roman
law in England, see Thomas Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chancery, Church
Courts, Admiralty, and Law Merchant, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

208, 212-43 (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1909) (explaining that the judges of the common law
courts did not recognize civil law as authoritative, but that the admiralty, equity, and
ecclesiastical courts "were largely influenced by the Civil Law, if their procedure was not entirely
derived from it").
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courts, it did not hear appeals from their decrees. 38 No single supreme
court, aside from the judicial wing of the House of Lords, had power to
examine all these sources of judicial authority. 39
Viewed from the English perspective, then, one might adopt an
expressio untus reading in which the text of Article III would be seen
as selecting three heads of judicial power and leaving the rest behind.
On this view, the courts of the United States have power to hear cases
at law, cases in equity, and cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, but no power to hear ecclesiastical or military matters. By
treating ecclesiastical jurisdiction as a separate category of judicial
power, this argument would essentially foreclose the Article III courts
from hearing the wide array of matters that fell exclusively to the
English church courts in the eighteenth century. 40 The matters so
foreclosed would include the probate of wills and the appointment of
personal representatives and executors to oversee a decedent's estate
as well as such family law matters as the annulment of marriages, the
provision of spousal support, and the provision of care for orphans.4 1
The fact that English ecclesiastical courts handled all of these matters
has long supplied a prominent justification for both the probate and
domestic relations exceptions. 42
38. For an account of King's Bench oversight through the writ of prohibition, see 1
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 629; see also Norma Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court
Christian, 20 MINN. L. REV. 272, 272-87 (1935). Professor Helmholz reports that ecclesiastical
courts sometimes ignored writs of prohibition and continued to adjudicate matters that King's
Bench regarded as off limits to them. See R.M. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 77 (1987). King's Bench also issued writs of mandamus to compel the issuance of
letters of administration in cases where the ecclesiastical courts wrongly refused to do so. See
WILLIAM TAPPING, MANDAMUS 82-83 (1842).

39.
HIGH

On the appellate role of the House of Lords, see 1 CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE
COURT OF PARLIAMENT

AND

ITS SUPREMACY

164

(1910)

(describing the

appellate

jurisdiction of the House of Lords). Decisions of the Lords controlled the particular dispute but
did not necessarily establish a precedent that commanded the respect of the superior courts. See
James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1652 (2011). The Lords did not exercise supervisory powers and could not play the
coordination role long associated with superior courts. Id.
40. Even viewed from an English perspective, one can hardly characterize the church
courts as exercising exclusive jurisdiction over matters of probate. Matters relating to the
oversight and enforcement of trusts, a common tool of estate planning for several centuries,
naturally came within the jurisdiction of the courts of equity. See Winkler, supranote 2, at 82-88
(discussing the predominance of equity in trust administration).
41. For further discussion of the contours of the ecclesiastical courts' exclusive jurisdiction
over probate matters, see infra Part III.
42. To be sure, most observers follow the Supreme Court and link the probate exception to
the omission of ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the statutory conferral of diversity jurisdiction in
'all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat.
73 (1789); see Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 306-08 (2006) (linking the probate exception
to the Judiciary Act of 1789); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698-701 (1992) (decreeing
that domestic relations exception would heretofore be regarded as having derived from the
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Yet the claim that the deliberate omission of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction now bars federal courts from hearing matters assigned to
the English church courts in the eighteenth century presents serious
textual, historical, and structural problems. Although the Framers of
Article III were quite familiar with the structure of the English court
system, they also had a variety of additional judicial structures
available as models for their handiwork. For example, they were
familiar with their own state judicial systems, which often assigned
probate jurisdiction not to church courts but to secular courts that
they variously called probate courts, ordinary courts, prerogative
courts, and orphans courts.43 Some of these courts did more than
admit wills to probate; they would grant relief at law or in equity.44 As
a consequence, we have little reason to believe that the Framers
regarded the probate of wills as a matter uniquely associated with the
exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction or that they would have regarded
the omission of ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the Article III
jurisdictional menu as signaling anything, one way or another, about
the power of the federal courts to hear probate matters.
If the expressio unius argument considerably weakens when
viewed against the backdrop of state judicial arrangements, it appears
to collapse entirely when one considers the nature of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. As their name suggests, ecclesiastical courts were
responsible for adjudicating claims relating to the obligations that
individuals owed as members of the established church.4 5 These
obligations extended quite broadly, including duties to refrain from
blasphemy and defamation, from loaning money on usurious terms,
and from engaging in such religious improprieties as drunkenness,
fornication, and adultery.4 6 The Church acceded to power over
domestic relations by virtue of its authority over marriage, birth,
bastardy, and the like.4 7 Its power over probate matters grew out of

limited scope of judicial authority conferred in the diversity jurisdictional grant). See generally
Nicolas, supra note 8, at 1500 (tracing the probate exception to the Judiciary Act of 1789).
43.
Nicolas, supra note 8, at 1514-19; Winkler, supranote 2, at 90-91 & nn.60-64.
44. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 91 (describing the varied powers of the colonial probate
courts and explaining that they sometimes granted relief available in England at law or in
equity). Following independence, some probate courts organized by the state governments
regarded themselves as exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction and incorporated the probate law
precedents from England. See Nicolas, supra note 8, at 1518.
45.
See generally, 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *62.
46. On the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 619;
COMMISSIONERS' REPORT, supra note 37, at 112-70 (describing ecclesiastical court jurisdiction
over such matters as marriage, adultery, church seats, dilapidations, tithes, sequestrations,
brawling, and defamation).
47. See generally, 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *422-33 (Chapter 15).
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end-of-life confession of sins, death-bed bequests, and a perception
that most individuals who died intestate would want their assets, if
any, used for religious purposes.4 8 In any case, the remedy for an
individual's refusal to comply with the order of an ecclesiastical court
was excommunication-exclusion from the established church.4 9
When one recognizes that the mind of the eighteenth century
lawyer tended to categorize law by linking writs and remedies, it
quickly becomes clear that no one involved in drafting Article III could
have seriously entertained the possibility of adding ecclesiastical
jurisdiction to the jurisdictional menu.5 0 While many of the states had
church establishments at the time of the framing, the United States as
a whole had no established church. 5 1 Even though the First
Amendment's ban on such national church establishments would not
take effect until 1791, the Constitution contemplated a secular rather
than a religious government. 52 Thus, the document refrains from any
invocation of the deity and explicitly forbids any religious test for
office. 53
It would have been incongruous in the extreme for the Framers
of such a secular government to have invested the federal judiciary
48. See infra Part III.B. 1.
49. Unlike chancery which had "considerable powers of enforcement," the remedies of the
church courts were limited to "excommunication." HELMHOLZ, supra note 38, at 97. But that
remedy threatened the target with the following serious consequences:
He was excluded from pleading in secular courts. His company was to be shunned by
all Christians. In England he could be arrested and imprisoned if the bishop
'signified" to the King that he had remained unrepentantly excommunicate for 40
days or more. Excommunication was, in short, an unhappy position from which an
ordinary man would seek to be released.
Id.; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 630-32 (summarizing disabilities).
50. For a persuasive argument that eighteenth century thinking about the use of judicial
power tended to revolve around remedies, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of
Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 784-92 (2004) (characterizing the cause of action in both law and
equity as remedies-based).
51.
For an account of the Framers' experience with established churches, both in England
and in the several states, see Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishmentat the
Founding,PartL Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110-11, 2126 (2003)
(reporting that five southern colonies and four counties of Metropolitan New York had
established religions at the time of the Revolution, that three colonies were created as havens for
dissenters, and that the Puritan establishment lasted in Massachusetts until 1833). The United
States, in keeping with the First Amendment, has never created an established church at the
national level.
52.

See generally, ALVIN W. JOHNSON & FRANK H. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND

STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-16 (2d ed. 1948) (tracing the idea that church and state should
be separated to a Declaration of Rights adopted by the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1776,
before the adoption of the Declaration of Independence).
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States."). Religious tests were an element of religious
establishment. See McConnell, supra note 51, at 2113.
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with the powers of ecclesiastical courts. The federal government had
no business issuing judicial decrees of excommunication to any
parishioner, no matter how far she had lapsed from the true faith. As
a consequence, one searches the records of the federal convention in
vain for any proposal to confer ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the federal
courts.5 4 If no one took seriously the possibility of including
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Article III, then surely the omission of
that jurisdiction has little resolving power in determining the range of
matters Article III courts can entertain.
Sure enough, when we drill down into the records of the
Philadelphia Convention in an effort to isolate the considerations that
apparently shaped the "law and equity" formulation in Article III, we
find little evidence that a desire to exclude the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts shaped that decision. As Article III emerged from
the Committee of Detail, it simply vested the "Judicial Power of the
United States" in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
Congress might choose to constitute.5 5 William Johnson, a delegate
from Connecticut, proposed to add "both in law and equity" after the
reference to the United States.5 6 According to Madison's notes,
Johnson proposed the change because he believed "the judicial power
ought to extend to equity as well as law."5 7 One delegate, George Read,
objected to "vesting these powers in the same Court,"5 8 but the motion
carried. Later, during deliberations on the Committee of Style report,
the convention dropped "law and equity" from Section 1's reference to
judicial power, opting for a "law and equity" reference as it now
appears as part of Section 2's provision for jurisdiction over all cases
arising under federal law.59 None of the discussions, as far as the
record reveals, adverted to the impact of these changes on federal
authority over ecclesiastical or probate matters.
Indeed, as one of us argued in an earlier work, Johnson's
proposed change in the judicial article was doubtless meant to broaden
the jurisdiction of the federal courts by giving them power to grant
relief in law and equity.6 0 While such joinder of law and equity was

54.

See 4 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION 125 (1910)

(omitting any reference to ecclesiastical courts from the index to debates at the constitutional
convention).
55.

Farrand
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 186 (Max

ed., 1966).
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621.
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 39, at 1666-70.
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unknown in England (except in the Court of Exchequer), Scotland
combined law and equity in a single supreme court, the Scottish Court
of Session. 6 1 Lord Kames, a leading figure of the Scottish
Enlightenment, urged the wisdom of such an expansive allocation of
judicial power, noting that the consolidation of legal and equitable
remedies in a single court simplified the task of providing complete
relief to the parties. 62 James Wilson, a leading Framer of Article III
and one of the first Justices of the Supreme Court, later defended
Kames's view in his well-known law lectures, urging that every court
of law ought also to be a court of equity. 6 3 In the FederalistPapers,
Alexander Hamilton offered a similar, if somewhat more Anglocentric,
defense of the joinder of law and equity.6 4
We thus have reason to conclude that the law-and-equity
formulation in Article III was meant to expand the scope of remedies
available to the federal courts and to offer the convenience of one-stop
shopping for litigants in need of redress. At the same time, we have
reason to doubt that the Framers meant the federal courts to issue
orders of excommunication of the kind that enforced the judgments of
the ecclesiastical courts in England. In that sense, surely, the federal
courts lacked ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But it does not follow from the
absence of a power to excommunicate that the federal courts were to
be permanently debarred from handling any of the subjects that fell to
the church courts of England. Usury litigation takes place in the
federal courts pursuant to federal statutes that regulate the amount of
interest federal banks may charge, as does litigation over defamation
claims. 6 5 No one would contend that the historic role of ecclesiastical
courts in usury and defamation places such matters beyond the
61.

See id. at 1626.

62.

See generally, HENRY HOME KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1760).

63.

2 JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON LAW (1791).

64. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton).
65.
On the power of ecclesiastical courts over usury claims, see HELMHOLZ, supra note 38,
at 324 ("The medieval church claimed exclusive jurisdiction to determine what conduct
amounted to usury."). As for defamation, see COMMISSIONERS' REPORT, supra note 37, at 167
("The cognizance of Causes of Defamation, forms a part of the ancient Jurisdiction of the
Ecclesiastical Courts."). For the federal judicial role in usury claims against national banks, see
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9-11 (2003) (concluding that federal law
completely preempts the application of state usury laws to national banks, thereby transforming
all such usury claims into federal rights of action subject to removal to the federal courts).
Federal courts hear defamation claims, more commonly in the exercise of original or
supplemental jurisdiction over state rights of action or more rarely on appeal from state courts
that fail to heed First Amendment limits on liability for statements made about public figures.
See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding on appeal from state court that the
First Amendment protected newspaper from liability for defamation of a public figure in the
absence of "malice"); Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying
the state law of defamation in the context of diversity-based original jurisdiction).
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constitutional reach of federal courts today. So too, we think, with
probate matters.
Structural considerations, including the well-known principle
of coextensivity, confirm this conclusion. The principle of coextensivity
holds that that the adjudicative authority of the federal courts should
extend to all questions of federal law, including those that implicate
constitutional guarantees, acts of Congress, and federal treaties.66 On
this view, if an individual raises a claim of constitutional right, the
federal courts should have power to hear the matter. And if Congress
chooses to regulate within a field of its competence, the federal courts
should have the authority to adjudicate claims growing out of such
federal regulation. The Framers secured the principle of coextensivity
through the extension of judicial power to all cases arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 67 While the scope of
constitutional and statutory rights may change over time, the power of
the federal courts will continue to extend to all federal questions.
The recognition of a probate exception could threaten the
principle of coextensivity. Imagine a state probate court that
discriminates on the basis of race or sex in the administration of a
specific estate. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court could review the state
court decree and remedy any unconstitutional forms of discrimination,
exercising its appellate jurisdiction over issues of federal law. 68 Yet

66. For canonical statements of the principle of coextensivity, see Osborn v. Bank of U.S.,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 809 (1824) (explaining that the aim of the judiciary article in extending
jurisdiction over all cases was to 'make it co-extensive with the power of legislation ... not to
limit and restrain."); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 384 (1821) (considering as a political axiom
the principle that "the judicial power ... must be co-extensive with the legislative, and must be
capable of deciding every judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws"). See

generally, Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 501-02 & n.269 (1994) ("[T]he
Federalists' axiom that judicial power must be commensurate with that of the political branches
makes no sense unless they viewed federal courts as final expositors of federal law, not mere
dispute resolvers.").
67.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton):
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority of the Union
ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out
of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional
powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern the execution of the provisions
expressly contained in the articles of Union . ...
68. On the importance of coextensivity, consider Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894).
There, the Court held that it violated due process for a probate court to subject an estate to
administration and authorize the sale of the property of a person who, though absent for seven
years, turned out to be still alive. Id. at 46-51. While the case arose as a collateral attack on the
probate disposition, one supposes that the Court could have heard the claim on direct review of
the probate court's decree had the individual appeared in time to assert the claim in that context.

See also Sheldon S. Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice
in ProbateProceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 420 (1952).
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such review would apparently be frustrated if the Court were to
regard Article III's grant of federal question jurisdiction as including a
probate exception. Or imagine a statute in which Congress specifically
conferred on the federal courts the power to probate wills and
administer estates that substantially affect interstate commerce.69
Assuming that Congress has the power to enact such a law, it would
violate the principle of coextensivity to deny the federal courts the role
they had been assigned.
We believe the principle of coextensivity helps to explain the
Court's sometimes awkward efforts to limit the probate and domestic
relations exceptions to matters brought to federal courts on the basis
of diversity jurisdiction. One can see that awkwardness, or inelegance,
in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,70 a leading example of the Court's efforts
to cabin the domestic relations exception. There, the Court proclaimed
the exception a creature of the diversity statute and went out of its
way to hold that the Constitution does not "exclude domestic relations
cases from the jurisdiction otherwise granted by statute to the federal
courts."7 1 In so doing, it secured both its own power to engage in
appellate review of state court decisions in the domestic relations
context and the power of the lower federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over any new federal-law domestic relations claims that
Congress has steered to the lower federal courts. 72 Justice Blackmun
called attention to the Court's ham-handedness, showing that the
rules of interpretation on which the Court relied were equally
applicable to federal-question claims as to diversity proceedings. 73
Although Justice Blackmun would have required federal courts to
abstain from hearing matters within the domestic relations exception
(thus reaching a conclusion similar to that of the majority), his

69. The statute might, for example, link federal power to estates with property in more
than one state and an asset value in excess of $10 million. On the scope of Congress's commerce
power, see supra note 25.

70.

504 U.S. 689, 695-704 (1992).

71. Id. at 695-96. The Court noted that its appellate jurisdiction, previously extended to
the review of domestic relations decisions of federal legislative courts, would be threatened by an
Article III exception. Id. at 696-97.
72. For a partial list of such federal question statutes, see id. at 715 n.8 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (listing some six federal statutes that regulate aspects of the parent-child
relationship). Since Blackmun's concurrence, new treaty obligations have added new domestic
relations cases to the federal docket. See, e.g., Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2013)
(discussing the role of the federal courts under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
in which they exercise the functional equivalent of concurrent jurisdiction over child custody
disputes).

73.

Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 715 n.8.
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separate opinion highlights the role that the principle of coextensivity
likely played in the majority's decision.74
One final point deserves brief mention as we conclude our
discussion of the law-and-equity limits of Article III. As Judge
Weinstein observed long ago in Spindel v. Spindel,75 a domestic
relations case, the Constitution's law-and-equity limits apply only to
cases arising under federal law. No similar limits apply to the Article
III grant of jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different
states. 76 Weinstein drew the logical conclusion: even if the law-andequity limits were deemed to exclude ecclesiastical matters from
Article III, the limits would not apply to matters brought within the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Weinstein thus raised the
possibility, disquieting from a coextensivity perspective, that the
Article III power of federal courts was potentially broader in diversity
than in federal question proceedings and could well embrace
ecclesiastical matters governed by state law.

B. Federalism
Because state law and state courts control many aspects of the
distribution of a decedent's property, traditional notions of federalism
may tend to encourage the view that the federal courts lack power to
entertain probate proceedings. At the time of the Framing, state court
systems handled probate matters, and few would have anticipated the
wholesale transfer of probate proceedings from state to federal court.
That, no doubt, helps to explain why the Framers of Article III did not
bother to address the power of the federal courts in relation to probate
matters; they likely had no reason to ponder a federal role as the
initial point of contact in probate issues. For the same reason, the
Framers were unlikely to have chosen the omission of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction from the federal jurisdictional menu as a way to ward off
the possible assertion of federal probate authority.
On occasion, the Court has suggested that this tradition of
state control may erect a constitutional barrier to federal judicial
involvement. Thus, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, it distinguished the
relatively broad judicial power of federal courts in the District of
Columbia from the more narrow authority of federal courts located in
one of the states.7 7 The Court characterized this narrow authority as
74. See id. at 716-17 (collecting the federal question matters that could have been
threatened by a broad domestic relations exception to Article III).
75. 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
76. Id. at 800-01.
77. 370 U.S. 530, 581 (1962).
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stemming from "limitations implicit in the rubric 'case or
controversy'" and described both domestic relations and probate
matters as illustrations of the sort of proceedings that were
"traditionally within the domain of the States."78
The Glidden Court stopped well short of holding that the
Constitution bars the federal courts from entertaining probate
proceedings. Its discussion simply sought to illustrate, in the context
of a dispute that failed to implicate the probate or domestic relations
exception, that the power of the federal courts in the District was
potentially broader than that of federal courts in the states.7 9 The
discussion of probate was unnecessary to the decision of the case and
thus qualifies
as dicta. More recent decisions, including
81 discuss the domestic relations and
Ankenbrandt80 and Marshall,
probate exceptions entirely in statutory terms and disclaim any
constitutional underpinnings to the doctrine. Time has thus
apparently marched on since Glidden's dicta, erasing any perceived
federalism-based limits on the scope of federal judicial power. As we
noted above, the principle of coextensivity helps to explain this
change. So long as the federal government can regulate aspects of the
probate of decedents' estates or enter into treaties that implicate
probate matters, its power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts
to hear any resulting disputes follows as a matter of course. 82
The Court's most recent decisions tend to confirm that
federalism does not operate as an independent limit on the scope of
the judicial power to consider probate or domestic matters. Consider

78. Id. at 581 & n.54. In earlier cases the Court noted that probate law was entirely
created by the states to help define the limits of federal jurisdiction in probate matters. See Ellis
v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883):
The original probate, of course, is [a] mere matter of state regulation, and depends
entirely upon the local law; for it is that law which confers the power of making wills,
and prescribes the conditions upon which alone they may take effect; and as, by the
law in all the states, no instrument can be effective as a will until proved, no rights in
relation to it, capable of being contested between parties, can arise until preliminary
probate has been first made.
See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 602 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (arguing on federalism
grounds against a federal judicial role in domestic relations).
79. The case dealt with the status of the Court of Claims and the Court of Custom Appeals
as Article III courts, concluding that their power to entertain some matters outside the scope of
the typical federal court docket did not deprive them of Article III status. See Glidden Co., 370
U.S. at 572-73.
80. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698-701 (1992).
81. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 306-07 (2006).
82.
Thus, Congress has assigned some custody litigation to federal court in the course of
implementing the Hague Convention on International Aspects of Child Abduction. See Chafin v.
Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1022 (2013).
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the decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.83 There, applying the
Indian Child Welfare Act,8 4 the Court reviewed a state court's
resolution of an action brought by an enrolled member of the Cherokee
Nation who claimed rights as the father of a child adopted by a nonIndian couple in South Carolina. The majority did not address the
possibility that the state court's interpretation of this federal statute
in the context of a child custody determination fell within the domestic
relations exception to Article 111.85 Justice Thomas did raise
constitutional doubts in his concurrence, but he based his argument
on his view that Congress lacks power under the Indian Commerce
Clause to regulate the parental rights of tribal members.86 Similarly,
in another case the Court noted the domestic relations context in
which a recent dispute arose over an ex-spouse's entitlement to the
death benefits of a federal employee. 8 7 But that context did not debar
federal adjudication, it merely created a "presumption against preemption" of somewhat limited strength.88 The current framework thus
suggests that, in both the probate and domestic relations context,
familiar rules of constitutional interpretation will define the scope of
Congress's regulatory authority and the preemptive effect of its
enactments under the Supremacy Clause. If federal law passes muster
under these tests, thereby overcoming federalism-based arguments for
local control, no Article III objection will arise to block federal
adjudication.

C. Cases and Controversies
Having thus dismissed traditional "law and equity" and
federalism-based explanations for the probate exception, we turn next
to examine the "case or controversy" requirement as a possible Article
III basis for the exception. The Supreme Court has long held that
Article III "confines the judicial power of the federal courts to deciding
actual 'Cases' or 'Controversies.' "89 Moreover, it has defined the case83. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (interpreting the Indian
Child Welfare Act to reverse the decision of the state supreme court).
84. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2014).
85. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559.
86. See id. at 2566-67 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the Indian Commerce
Clause does not provide Congress with a source of power to regulate non-economic activity, such
as parental rights).
87. Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013).
88. Id. (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 151 (2001)). As it turns out, the
presumption was overcome in the particular case and the Court found that a Virginia statute
was preempted. See id. at 1953.
89. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013).
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or-controversy requirement to require the appearance of adverse
parties. Probate proceedings often begin with a simple application for
the admission of a will to probate, a proceeding known historically as
probate in the common form. Unless someone appears to contest the
admission of the will to probate (thereby triggering a will contest
between adverse parties), the proceeding may continue on an ex parte
basis. The Supreme Court has occasionally suggested that the
adverse-parties requirement may prevent the federal courts from
entertaining such an ex parte proceeding.9 0 (We return to these cases
in part IV.)
A second, related objection arises from the administrative
character of much of the work performed in a typical probate
proceeding. Once a court has admitted a will to probate, it will
typically name a personal representative to act as a fiduciary in
collecting and distributing the assets of the decedent's estate. The
personal representative's administrative process may entail litigation,
either to defend the estate from the claims of creditors or to prosecute
claims on behalf of the estate against the decedent's debtors. Such
inter partes disputes have frequently appeared on the dockets of the
federal courts when the requirements of diversity were satisfied1
Sometimes, however, no such disputes will arise, thus depriving the
proceeding of any adverse quality. The probate court eventually issues
an order to approve the distribution of the estate's assets in
accordance with the terms of the will, providing the personal
representative with a measure of immunity from future claims. In
most cases, one assumes, probate proceedings begin and end without
any disputation.
The uncontested nature of many probate proceedings poses a
challenge to federal cognizance and a problem of jurisdictional theory.
If, as the Court has sometimes suggested, the adverse-party rule
applies inflexibly and with equal force to all matters brought before
Article III courts, the rule could create a substantial gap in, or probate
exception to, federal judicial power. But we do not believe such an
across-the-board adverse-party rule has been consistently applied. To
90. See Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883):
Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included in nor excepted
out of the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United States. So far as it is ex
parte and merely administrative, it is not conferred and cannot be exercised by them
at all until, in a case at law or in equity, its exercise becomes necessary to settle a
controversy of which a court of the United States may take cognizance by reason of
the citizenship of the parties.
For Judge Posner's echo of this perception, see infra note 176.
91. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 117-25 (tracing the evolution of federal diversity
jurisdiction over inter partes disputes over assets subject to probate administration).
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the contrary, Congress has repeatedly conferred judicial power on the
federal courts to hear uncontested or ex parte proceedings, and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly validated the exercise of judicial power
over such matters. Far from an anomalous departure from a
thoroughgoing adverse-party rule, these instances of federal ex parte
or administrative practice represent illustrations of a heretofore
obscure form of federal jurisdiction known as "noncontentious"
jurisdiction. Rooted in Roman-canonical procedure and incorporated
into the civil law codes of Europe, noncontentious jurisdiction also
took hold in the equity, admiralty, and ecclesiastical practice of the
courts of England and in the legal practice of British North America.
For reasons that one of us develops at greater length
elsewhere, 92 we think the practice of noncontentious jurisdiction by
the courts of the United States has become too deeply embedded to
dismiss as anomalous or aberrational. At least four separate
arguments support this conclusion. First, the Framers were quite
familiar with court systems that did not invariably insist on full party
adverseness as a condition of the exercise of judicial power. 93 Second,
in the years immediately after the framing, Congress assigned, and
the federal courts agreed to hear, a range of ex parte proceedings.9 4
Third, the federal courts continue to hear a variety of ex parte and
nonadverse matters, suggesting that the adverse-party rule should be
understood, pace Justice Kennedy, as a prudential element of federal
justiciability law9 5 rather than an ironclad requirement of Article III.
92.
See Pfander & Birk, supra note 23 (listing applications for search and FISA warrants,
uncontested bankruptcy proceedings, and subpoenas, among others, as proceedings that lack
adverse parties).
93.
The Roman law tradition included both contentious and noncontentious jurisdiction
within the judicial power. Noncontentious or voluntary jurisdiction typically entailed an exparte
application for a judicial decision or certification of some sort. Many judicial proceedings in the
civil law tradition thus included exparte features, including proceedings in admiralty and certain
forms of proceeding before the Scottish Court of Session, the high court of Scotland.
94. Thus, Congress assigned the federal circuit courts to hear ex parte pension petitions of
disabled war veterans, an authority the Justices refused to exercise due to a lack of finality. For
an account, see James E. Pfander, JudicialCompensation and the Definition of JudicialPower in
the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008). In addition, Congress in 1790 authorized
aliens to seek naturalized citizenship by filing ex parte petitions and accompanying evidence with
the federal district courts. See James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the
Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96
VA. L. REV. 359, 359-441 (2010). In neither instance did the judges suggest that the absence of
adverse parties foreclosed their consideration of the petitions.
95. For a list of the matters that federal courts consider on an ex parte basis today, see
Pfander & Birk, supra note 23. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Windsor described the adverse-parties requirement as a prudential element of the Court's
justiciability doctrines. See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013); see also Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S.
236, 243 (1998) (finding that an ex parte application for a certificate of appealability was a "case"
in the Courts of Appeals for purposes of the Court's own certiorari jurisdiction).
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To provide a concrete example, the federal courts perform the
functional equivalent of probate oversight in connection with
bankruptcy proceedings. 96 Bankruptcy filings begin with a petition
that may, or may not, be contested.9 7 Debtors often secure uncontested
discharges of their obligations; if the debtor has no assets, creditors
have little reason to participate. Scholars have argued that ex parte
bankruptcy proceedings test the limits of the Article III adverse-party
requirement, but we have yet to hear judicial doubts about their
constitutionality.9 8
Fourth and perhaps more significantly, the Court's own
decisional law upholds the power of the federal courts to hear ex parte
proceedings.9 9 In the leading case, Tutun v. United States, the Court
addressed the question whether it was permissible for Article III
courts to entertain ex parte petitions for naturalization. The Court
upheld the federal judicial role, pointing to a history that dated to
early naturalization laws in the 1790s and to the possibility that the
United States might appear as an adverse party in any particular
case. 100 Some argue that the Court's construct of potential adverseness
may be available in bankruptcy to sustain an ex parte proceeding; 101
after all, creditors might come forward to contest any bankruptcy
petition. Similarly, an ex parte probate petition may lead to a will
contest and a change from a common to a solemn form proceeding.102
Indeed, one suspects that heirs and legatees appear more frequently
in will contests than did the United States in nineteenth-century
naturalization proceedings. To the extent potential adverseness
96. See Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General
Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 833-34 (2000) (explaining
that federal common law granted subject-matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy pleadings through
diversity jurisdiction, which then extended jurisdiction to allow courts to consider any claims by
the debtor's creditors).
97. Id.; cf Ralph E. Avery, Article III and Title 11: A Constitutional Collision, 12 BANKR.
DEV. J. 397, 417-18 n. 137 (1996) (arguing that the bankruptcy petition itself, and various other
aspects of bankruptcy practice, do not present justiciable controversies).
98. Id.; see Brubaker, supra note 96; cf Avery, supra note 97.
99. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider ex parte naturalization petitions and observing that the United States is
"always a possible adverse party."). Although the Tutun Court faced an issue concerning the
scope of appellate jurisdiction, it resolved that issue by treating exparte naturalization petitions
as "cases" within the meaning of Article III. See id. at 576-77.
100. Id.
101. See Pfander & Birk, supra note 39.
102. See Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1883) (outlining differences in probate
procedures throughout the states and weighing their effects on possible arguments for and
against establishing subject-matter jurisdiction in federal courts). For more on the historical
origins of the relationship between common form and solemn form probate proceedings, see infra
Part III.B.2.
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operates as a cure to any shortage of party adverseness, in short, it
could save the federal judicial role in probate from any Article III
challenge.
For several reasons, however, we do not believe that the
presence of potential adversaries can explain the power of the federal
courts to entertain ex parte matters. First, the cases do not
consistently articulate such a theory in the course of upholding the
exercise of noncontentious jurisdiction; even in Tutun, Justice
Brandeis mentioned potential adverseness in an offhand, makeweight
sort of way. Second, the Court's Article III case-or-controversy
jurisprudence does not recognize the viability of arguments based on
potential interests. Indeed, in one of the Court's most recent standing
decisions, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court reiterated
that "threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute
injury in fact" and that "[a]llegations of possible future injury" will not
suffice. 103 Ripeness decisions point in the same direction, rejecting the
idea that a future disagreement can support the invocation of the
judicial power. 104 On this view, a potential future adversary cannot
confer power over a pending case any more than the prospect of
hypothetical future injury can confer standing and ripeness in a case
where they are lacking. 105
How then can one square ex parte practice with the adverseparty requirement? We believe the answer lies in the very different
language that Article III uses in conferring judicial power on the
courts of the United States in "cases" and "controversies." As we have
seen, the term "cases" as used in the judicial article extends to claims
of right that touch upon the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. 106 We believe that federal courts can administer federal

103. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
104. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (requiring a
sufficiently immediate injury to create an actual controversy requiring immediate relief); F.
Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 55, 65-66 (2012) (arguing that
probabilistic injuries should be regarded as satisfying the standing requirement).
105. An intriguing opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, rendered in connection with the
1978 adoption of a FISA warrant process, points to the same conclusion. See Memorandum from
John M. Harmon, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Honorable Edward P. Boland,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Apr. 18, 1978), in Foreign
Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R.
5632, Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th
Cong. 26, 31 (1978) (arguing that the prospect of adversity cannot supply the sort of live dispute
that justiciability doctrine requires). The OLC nonetheless concluded that FISA warrants were
proper subjects for judicial cognizance by analogy to warrants issued in other settings. Id.
106. See Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.)
(explaining that the judicial power in cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of

2014]

IN SEARCH OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION

1557

law by hearing ex parte claims under procedures adopted by Congress
(such as naturalization petitions upheld in Tutun v. United States107).
But this power of administration likely extends only to cases that
implicate federal law. Federal jurisdiction over "controversies," by
contrast, extends only to the resolution of disputes between
adversaries. When state law supplies the rule of decision and
jurisdiction depends on the alignment of the parties, the federal courts
can play only a dispute-resolution role. We believe in short that the
power of the federal courts to entertain original ex parte proceedings
comes into play only when the claim rests upon federal law. 108
A surprisingly substantial body of evidence supports this claim.
Thus, in practice, the federal courts have entertained original ex parte
applications for judicial recognition of rights conferred by federal law
(such as naturalization petitions and pension applications), but they
have consistently required disputes over matters governed by general
or state law (such as equity receiverships and probate matters). Apart
from practice, the text and early interpretation of Article III support
the suggested distinction between "cases" (which encompass original
ex parte applications) and "controversies" (which do not). The term
"case" does not connote the presence of an opposing party in quite the
same way that the term "controversy" does. Indeed, leading
interpretations of the term "case" were phrased in terms broad enough
to encompass ex parte submissions. Chief Justice Marshall explained
that the judicial power was "capable of acting only when the subject is
submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case."109 It appears that
the United States "is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who
asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law"). For an account of Chief Justice Marshall's
theory of a case, see Pfander & Birk, supra note 23.
107. 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (treating an ex parte application to federal district court for
naturalized citizenship as a case arising under federal law within the power of the federal
district courts). For an account of Tutun, see Pfander & Birk, supra note 23.
108. In our view, federal courts that first obtain jurisdiction over a dispute can exercise
ancillary noncontentious jurisdiction over certain uncontested matters that crop up in the course
of resolving that dispute. Thus, the federal courts must approve uncontested class action
settlement agreements, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and conduct exparte proceedings in connection
with the entry of default judgments, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, even where the claims at issue rest on
state law. Similarly, suits brought by creditors to enforce rights based on state or common law
could result in the initiation of equitable receiverships and the often substantial administrative
chores they entail. See, e.g., Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929). The limit on judicial power
thus applies to the exercise of jurisdiction over an original petition that appears, uncontested, in
federal court, such as a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
109. The full quote reads as follows:
This clause [extending jurisdiction to federal question "cases"] enables the judicial
department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a
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Marshall, who was later to proclaim an ex parte order granting
naturalized citizenship conclusive as the "judgment" of a court of
record, 110 phrased the definition of "cases" to sweep in noncontentious
claims of right by a single party, rather than just contentious claims
between opponents.
If we correctly understand the case-controversy distinction,
Article III has rather straightforward implications for the power of
federal courts to entertain probate proceedings. We see no barrier to
the exercise of probate jurisdiction under a federal law enacted
pursuant to a proper source of congressional power. Just as federal
bankruptcy proceedings have long entailed the exercise of both
contentious and noncontentious jurisdiction, we believe that the power
of Article III courts over a federalized body of probate law could
include consideration of uncontested common form probate
applications. Uncontested probate applications arising under such a
federal law should present a "case" within the judicial power, just as
uncontested naturalization petitions did in the nineteenth century.
When state law provides the rule of decision and jurisdiction depends
on the alignment of the parties, however, Article III permits the
federal courts to play only a dispute-resolution role. In other words,
the durable distinction between ex parte probate matters (which the
state courts routinely control) and inter partes disputes between the
estate and its heirs, creditors, and legatees may well reflect the

form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting
only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States.
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 408 (1821) (defining the term
suits to include "all cases where the party suing claims to obtain something to which he has a
right"). Story's Commentaries on the Constitution adopts the same formulation: "A case, then, in
the sense of this clause of the constitution, arises when some subject touching constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States is submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the
form prescribed by law." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 485 (1858). For
both Marshall and Story, then, the key to a "case" was the assertion of a federal question claim of
right in the form prescribed by law. Id.; see also Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819.
110. Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected the argument that exparte judicial proceedings to
naturalize were merely ministerial and did not enjoy the conclusive quality of matters of record.
See Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. 393, 402 (1830) (argument of counsel) (contending that
naturalization proceedings were not judicial but merely "ministerial"; that there were no parties
to the proceeding but that instead " [a]ll is ex parte"). Justice Story was equally convinced that ex
parte petitions for the remission or mitigation of tax forfeitures were proper subjects of judicial
cognizance: "In the performance of this duty, the judge exercises judicial functions, and is bound
by the same rules of evidence, as in other cases." The Margaretta, 16 F. Cas. 719, 721 (1815).
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limited constitutional power of federal courts to entertain original ex
parte administrative proceedings grounded in state law.111
Similarly, the requirement that courts in probate proceedings
appoint a personal representative or executor to collect and distribute
the assets of the estate does not appear to pose an insurmountable
obstacle to federal management of probate estates. The Appointments
Clause of Article II clearly empowers Congress to invest the
appointment of "inferior officers" in the "courts of law." 112 The federal
courts have long exercised the power to appoint magistrate judges,
bankruptcy judges, court clerks, special masters, and others who
assist in the litigation process. 1 13 In response to Hayburn's Case, one
of the nation's earliest encounters with limits on judicial power,
Congress identified commissioners (appointed by the federal district
courts) as the initial forum for the determination of the pension claims
of disabled veterans.1 14 Federal courts of equity played a similar
appointment and oversight role later in the nineteenth century,

111. We distinguish between original ex parte applications, such as naturalization petitions,
and ancillary ex parte proceedings, such as judicial investigation of consent decrees and default
judgments. Such ancillary powers of judicial inquiry, though nominally non-contentious, enter
federal court as contentious proceedings that typically satisfy the adverse-party requirement. See
Pfander & Birk, supra note 23.
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. For an overview of the drafting history and early application of
the "court of law" provision, see James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior
Officers, and the "Court of Law" Requirement, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1125, 1147-49 (2013).
113. See generally id. at 1151-53 (describing the congressional enactments authorizing the
federal courts to appoint clerks, commissioners, and magistrates). More controversially, in
Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court allowed a specially constituted federal court to appoint
independent counsel under the Ethics in Government Act, even though the statute did not place
the counsel in a subordinate relationship to the appointing court. See 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
The Court first concluded that the interbranch character of the appointment did not pose a
constitutional problem. Id. at 664. Second, the Court found that the explicit grant of appointment
authority in Article II provided the federal courts with a source of appointment authority
independent of those that would advance their Article III responsibility for the adjudication of
cases and controversies. Id. at 676. Both features of the Morrison decision have drawn their
share of criticism. See id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's decision to weaken
the structural integrity of the separation of powers doctrine); see also MARTIN H. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL POWER 15-22 (2d ed. 1992).
We simply observe that the judicial appointment of an officer to oversee probate proceedings does
not implicate either controversial feature of Morrison: as an intrabranch appointment that seeks
to advance the administration of decedents' estates, such an appointment would appear to fall
squarely within a litigation-centric vision of Article II that even Morrison's sharpest critics have
accepted. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to criticize the
majority's ruling that jurisdiction could be questioned through Article III's "Case or Controversy"
requirement).
114. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409-10 (1792).
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appointing equity receivers to control the assets of railroads and other
corporate entities in financial crisis. 1
In sum, we believe that Article III courts have ample power to
hear ex parte proceedings, but their noncontentious jurisdiction
extends only to disputes brought before the federal courts as federal
question "cases" arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. "Controversies," as described in Article III, do not
implicate federal law but instead qualify for federal adjudication
based on the identity of the opposing parties. The most common form
of "controversy" jurisdiction-that over disputes between citizens of
different states-has long been treated as conferring power to resolve
disputes rather than to administer the law. Simply put, we do not
believe that federal courts can exercise noncontentious jurisdiction
when the matter turns on state law and jurisdiction depends on the
existence of a controversy. The plain language of Article III appears to
have ruled out federal judicial cognizance of ex parte and
administrative matters of probate. As the next part explains, the
Court's nineteenth-century decisions tend to confirm this account of
the probate exception.
III. EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION
Nineteenth-century decisions give voice to something like the
narrow conception of the probate exception that we have sketched.
Those cases certainly recognized a probate exception and assumed, on
occasion, that the exception rested on a constitutional foundation. 116
But the simple fact remains that Congress had not conferred probate
authority on the federal courts, either in federal question "cases" or
diverse-party "controversies," so the Court had no occasion to address
the constitutional issue head on.
The relevant statute, the Judiciary Act of 1789, authorized the
federal circuit courts to hear only "suits" in "law and equity" between
diverse parties; 117 no probate authority was conferred. Moreover,
Congress implemented this rule with progressively more explicit
references to the equity practice and procedure of the English courts of
chancery. By tying practice to English conceptions of the scope of
equity, Congress ruled out probate proceedings; neither the English
common law courts nor the High Court of Chancery admitted wills to

115. For a discussion of federal jurisdiction to appoint receivers, see Riehle v. Margolies, 279

U.S. 218, 223 (1929).
116. See discussion infra Part III.C.
117. Judicial Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73.

2014]

IN SEARCH OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION

1561

probate or appointed personal representatives to manage decedents'
estates.
In this Part, we set the stage for an examination of the leading
precedents by quickly recounting the adoption of the federal
jurisdictional statute and the rules regulating equity practice. Then
we sketch the practice of the courts of law and equity in England,
highlighting the areas in which their authority overlapped with that
of the ecclesiastical courts in probate matters. With this background
in place, we examine the Supreme Court's leading nineteenth century
decisions on the power of federal courts to entertain probate
proceedings.

A. Lower Federal Courts and the Scope of Equitable Jurisdiction
Congress first implemented Article III in the Judiciary Act of
1789, creating two sets of lower federal courts and staffing the
Supreme Court with six Justices. 118 District courts were established in
each state with but a single district judge and jurisdiction over cases
involving the collection of taxes on imported goods, cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, and modest criminal matters.1 1 9 The early
district courts had no general jurisdiction in equity. Circuit courts
were also established in each state, staffed with the state's district
judge and one or two circuit-riding Justices. 120 Circuit courts had
broader authority, including power to hear more serious crimes, civil
disputes involving aliens, and suits in "law and equity" between
citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeded
$500.121 The reference to law and equity gave the circuit courts a
measure of authority to hear disputes growing out of decedents'
estates but (as we shall see) did not include the power to admit a will
to probate.
A series of rules governing practice and procedure further
defined the equitable powers of the federal circuit courts, driving them
to emulate English practice. The first such rules were rather open118. See id. Accounts of the Act include JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 457-508 (1969).

119. See Landmark JudicialLegislation: JudiciaryAct of 1789, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fic.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark 02.html (last visited September 1, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/7VZN-4Q54. See generally 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

(Maeva Marcus et al., eds., 1992).
120. See Landmark Judicial Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 119. See
generally 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 17891800: ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 119.

121. See Judicial Act of 1789,

§ 12 (establishing federal

diversity jurisdiction).
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ended. Congress simply declared in 1789 that the "forms and modes of
proceedings in causes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction shall be according to the course of the civil law." 122 Such
language would certainly support, if not compel, resort to English
practice in the High Courts of Chancery and Admiralty. A slightly
different formulation appeared in 1792; for suits in equity and
admiralty, Congress adopted the forms and modes of proceeding
"according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of
equity and to courts of admiralty." 12 3 But it added two outs: conferring
discretion on the courts themselves to change or supplement the rules
and empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe rules to govern
proceedings in the lower courts. 124
Most observers, including the Court, assumed that the statute
was meant to adopt the rules of practice of the English court of
chancery. Thus, the Court explained in 1818 (in a delicate feat of
circumlocution perhaps necessitated by the then-recent memories of
the War of 1812) that it considered as controlling the rules of equity
practice as they developed in "that country from which we derive our
knowledge of those principles." 12 5 So matters remained until 1822,
when the Court promulgated a formal set of equity rules to govern
practice in the lower federal courts. 126 Reportedly drafted by Justice
Joseph Story, later the author of a well-regarded treatise on equity,
the rules of equity bore the distinctive stamp of English law. Later
versions of the equity rules appeared in 1842 and 1912.127 While the
rules evolved, they continued to reflect their English origins. As we
discuss next, this English background helps to explain why federal
courts, sitting in equity to resolve a controversy between diverse
parties, would have viewed themselves as lacking the power to admit
wills to probate.

122. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93-94.
123. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275-76.
124. Id.
125. See Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1818) (explaining that early American
principles of equity were derived from those in place in England).
126. See History of the Federal Judiciary: Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fic.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction-equity.html
(last visited September 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QC99-TSAH (explaining the history
of equity jurisdiction in the federal courts).
127. Id.
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B. A Sketch of the English Allocation of Jurisdictionover
ProbateMatters
The English legal system was composed of several distinct
court systems operating in parallel, including courts of common law,
equity, and admiralty as well as ecclesiastical and military courts.
Each court had its own powers, procedures, and areas of competence.
One consequence of this jurisdictional division of labor was that,
depending on the circumstances and the remedy sought, complete
relief for a given dispute might require the same parties to litigate the
same issues in different courts, creating substantial jurisdictional
overlap. Inheritance law was one area of law in which such overlap
was common. While ecclesiastical courts had primary jurisdiction over
essential probate functions, the courts of common law and equity also
entertained suits related to the decedent's property. This Section
traces the evolution of probate disputes in England from their
medieval origins to their status in 1790, briefly outlines the types of
procedures used in probate courts, and finally examines the overlap
between such courts and those of law and equity.
1. Medieval Origins
We begin with a look at the work of ecclesiastical courts, which
had acquired jurisdiction over probate by the fourteenth century. 128 In
early medieval England, a man's widow and heirs were entitled to
inherit portions of his personal property regardless of his wishes,
leaving only the remainder free to be devised according to the
decedent's final will. 129 Individuals died "intestate" if they left no final
will directing the disposition of all of their goods. Originally the
remainder of an intestate decedent's testable personal property went
to the king, though the Crown sometimes delegated that right to local
lords over their intestate tenants. 130 At the time it was understood

128. ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF
THE LAW OF WILLS: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 108 (1928).

129. The portions of a decedent's estate reserved in this way were termed the wife and heirs'
'reasonable parts." A surviving wife and heirs would each receive one-third of the decedent's
personal property, leaving only a third to be devised. In the event that the deceased had no issue,
the wife would receive one-half, leaving the other half to be devised. Similarly one-half would go
to the heirs in the event that there was no wife. By the old laws of England people could only
devise all of their personal property if they left neither spouse nor children. 2 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 36, at *492. Regardless of how much of a decedent's estate was testable, the
decedent's executor had authority to seize the entirety of the estate before distributing the
'reasonable parts" and the residue. REPPY & TOMPKINS, supranote 128, at 115.
130. 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 36, at *494.
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that the "man who dies intestate will probably have died unconfessed,"
and so it was thought that his personal property should be put to
posthumous use for the benefit of the decedent's soul, whose fate was
otherwise uncertain. 131 Pursuant to that goal, the king gave the
church the right to dispose of intestate personal property as it saw fit,
since the clergy were most qualified to put such property to pious use
in the name of the deceased. 132
The church's interest in the decedent's personal property
shaped probate proceedings, encouraging the ecclesiastical courts to
require proof that such wills were valid. 133 Should the ecclesiastical
court be satisfied with the proof of a will's validity, it would grant
probate (from the Latin probare, meaning to prove or demonstrate),
"which consisted of a certification by an authorized court that proof of
compliance with the law had been made." 134 At first, a decedent's
estate was administered directly by church officials. 135 This evidently
resulted in widespread abuse, and so the ecclesiastical court was
compelled "to delegate its powers to administrators, whom it was
131.

1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 626-27.

132. Because "spiritual men are of better conscience than laymen, and that they had more
knowledge what things would conduce to the benefit of the soul of the deceased." 2 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 36, at *494.
133. REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 128, at 108-09:
Having jurisdiction over administration, it seemed logical that the ecclesiastical
courts should also acquire a right to investigate any circumstances which might
deprive them of the benefit of administration, such as a testament, alleged to have
been executed by the person deceased. This, of course, called for proof that the
testament had been executed, published and attested as the law required, and that
the testator possessed a sound and disposing mind at the time.
See also 2 BLACKSTONE, supranote 36, at *494:
And, as [the church] had thus the disposition of intestates' effects, the probate of wills
of course followed: for it was thought just and natural, that the will of the deceased
should be proved to the satisfaction of the prelate, whose right of distributing his
chattels for the good of his soul was effectually superseded thereby.
Some local lords or boroughs evidently retained rights to their tenant's intestate personal
property even after the king gave most such rights to the church. In those areas it was the local
manor courts rather than the ecclesiastical courts which would determine the validity of wills,
since it was the local authorities rather than the church which stood to gain intestate property
should the will prove invalid. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 84 n.29 (explaining reasoning
allowing local manor courts in England to determine validity of wills as opposed to ecclesiastical
courts).
134. REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 128, at 109.
135. Initially, after distributing the personal property belonging to spouses and heirs, the
church kept the entire residue of the estate without paying any of the decedent's debts. 2
BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *495. The first significant check on the church's authority in this
area was a statute mandating that the church first pay the decedent's debts before taking the
residue. Id. Nevertheless, abuse and fraud continued to be prevalent for as long as the church
directly administered estates. Id.; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 627. (noting
distribution of property by the church was often marked by fraudulence until legislative
interference).
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obliged to appoint from among the relatives of the deceased." 136 Thus
even after the church lost the ability to directly dispose of intestate
estates as it saw fit, it retained jurisdiction both to grant probate to
wills and, should no will be proved, to issue letters of administration
designating a personal representative of the intestate estate who
would then be responsible for its lawful distribution. 137
The role of the ecclesiastical courts in probate law was thus
twofold. If there was a valid will, then the court would officially
authorize the executor named therein to take possession of the
decedent's property and distribute it according to the testator's intent.
Otherwise the ecclesiastical court would appoint an administrator.
Administrators exercised powers similar to those of executors, save for
the fact that there was, by definition, no will or testament to govern
distribution of the estate. 138 Apart from a short interruption during
the Interregnum, those two essential features of probate lawgranting probate and appointing a personal representative to
administer the decedent's estate-remained in the hands of the
ecclesiastical courts well into the nineteenth century. 139
2. Early Modern England
By the late eighteenth century, English ecclesiastical courts
conducted two kinds of probate proceedings: probate in the common
form and probate in the solemn form. Probate in the common form
was an ex parte proceeding that the executor generally initiated upon
production of the will.140 The ecclesiastical court would grant probate
upon the oath of the executor as to the validity of the will or, in the
event of some irregularity, its proof by affidavit. 141 These proceedings
136. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 8, at 627.
137. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *495-96 (explaining church's power to grant
probates to wills and appoint administrators).
138. See id. at *507. A will was sometimes annexed to an administration after an
administrator was appointed, in which case administrators were even more similar to executors.
Id. One other difference is that administrators were appointed by the ecclesiastical court and
had no power to administer an estate until after their appointment, while executors were
appointed by decedents in their final will or testament, and could begin executing that
instrument without first waiting for it to be probated. Id. Of course, should they execute a will
later invalidated, the executors would expose themselves to liability. Id.
139. During the Interregnum, the Long Parliament replaced ecclesiastical courts with a
secular Court for the Probate of Wills and Granting of Administration. 2 ACTS AND ORDS.
INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 702-03 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait, eds., 1972). For a discussion of the
probate reforms considered and ultimately implemented by the Long Parliament, see LLOYD
BONFIELD, DEVISING, DYING AND DISPUTE: PROBATE LITIGATION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 53-

57(2012).
140. REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 128, at 112.
141. Id.
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were not contested, and because no notice was given to the next of kin,
parties with an adverse interest were not likely to be present. 142 This
process established the prima facie validity of a will by simply
confirming that it met with the canon law requirements for a valid
will. 143 Probate in the common form was relatively quick and
inexpensive, but it was not binding on future proceedings to probate
the will in solemn form.14 4 Probate in the common form was not a
prerequisite for the initiation of a solemn form proceeding, and in fact,
parties foreseeing disputes over the validity of the will would often
choose to pursue the solemn form in the first instance. 145
Probate in the solemn form established the final, rather than
the prima facie, validity of the will.14 6 Unlike at common form, this
was a contested inter partes proceeding in which all interested parties
were notified and given an opportunity to attend and be heard.14 7
Executors could initiate this process themselves, though the process
was also triggered if any interested party disputed the validity of the
will, even if it had already been proved in a prior common form
proceeding. 148 Solemn form probate generally followed the canon law
rules of procedure used by the ecclesiastical courts, 149 distinct from the
adversarial procedures used in English courts of common law or
equity. At the conclusion of the proceeding, the court would either
grant probate to the will or appoint a representative to administer the
estate.
Apart from initial matters of probate and administration,
ecclesiastical courts could handle a number of disputes related to the
estate. Parties named in the will could bring inter partes suits in
ecclesiastical court against the executor to collect debts from the
decedent's estate, 15 0 at least where the will mentioned the debt. 15 1
However, limitations on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts

142. Id.; see also BONFIELD, supra note 139, at 250-51 (discussing uncontested English
ecclesiastical court probate proceedings).
143. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 84 n.34 (explaining ecclesiastical courts would use canon
law to establish prima facie validity of will).
144. BONFIELD, supra note 139, at 251.
145. Id.
146. Winkler, supra note 2, at 85.
147. REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 128, at 112.
148. Id.
149. The plaintiff (usually the will's advocate) would first make their case and call
witnesses, after which the adverse parties would make their allegations and call their witnesses,
until finally the judge made a determination. Id. at 112-13.
150. Id. at 132. Ecclesiastical courts could also demand an inventory of the decedent's estate
and an accounting of the administration. Id. at 118.
151. Winkler, supra note 2, at 85.
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meant that some parties could only satisfy their interests in the
decedent's estate by pursuing separate actions in England's secular
courts. Common law courts handled various debts claims and disputes
over the inheritance of land, while the courts of equity oversaw the
administration and enforcement of trusts and acted as courts of last
resort when remedies were unavailable in other tribunals.
3. Managing the Overlap of Law, Equity, and Probate
We can now sketch the division of judicial labor in England
with a view toward better understanding what those who drafted the
Judiciary Act of 1789 meant in limiting the federal judicial role to
suits in law and equity. Although common law courts had broad
jurisdiction over freehold property claims, they did not assert
jurisdiction over probate. Indeed, the validity of a will was, at least
initially, a matter for ecclesiastical authority alone. 152 Still, common
law courts were the primary venue for resolving disputes over the
inheritance of freehold property. Under feudal assumptions,
ownership of land was thought to pass immediately to one's legal
heirs. 153 Common law courts exercised jurisdiction over title to land
through the all-purpose action in ejectment5 4 and retained that
jurisdiction in the sixteenth century when restrictions on the
decedent's ability to transfer freehold property by will and devise were
loosened. 15 5 Common law courts thus came to deal with wills only
indirectly, as evidence for use in the course of otherwise proper
proceedings. 156
The role of the courts of equity was to provide just relief where
no adequate remedy was available in another forum. As remedial gaps
appeared during the tug-of-war between the ecclesiastical and
common law courts over the remedies they could provide, courts of
equity stepped in. Creditors who sought to collect debts from the lands
of the deceased found their remedies at law inadequate and turned to

152. See, e.g., The King v. Inhabitants of Netherseal, (1742) 100 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (K.B.)
("[N]othing but the probate, or letters of administration with the will annexed, are legal evidence

of the will in all questions respecting personality."); see also Winkler, supra note 2, at 84 n.32
(explaining that common law courts could not raise issue of will validity not previously
established).
153. Winkler, supra note 2, at 82-83.
154. Id.
155. Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
156. See Winkler, supra note 2, at 83 n.25 (citing Eccleston v. Petty, (1689) 90 Eng. Rep. 650
(K.B.)) (noting that common law courts only determined will validity indirectly and dealt with it
similar to validity of a deed).
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equity. 157 Having authority to enforce trusts on freehold property,
equity came to agree that it had the power to impose and oversee a
constructive trust on inherited lands. 158 Chancery also agreed to
require detailed accounts from the personal representatives of
decedents' estates, after concluding that the alternatives were too
highly technical and narrow in scope to provide effective relief. 15 9 Over
time, these roles grew; once an ecclesiastical court had passed on the
probate of a will and appointed a personal representative, courts of
equity could exercise comprehensive power over most every
controversy touching the decedent's estate. 16 0 There was, in short,
nothing inherent in matters of probate or inheritance that blocked
courts of law and equity from intervening.

C. The FederalProbateException in the Nineteenth Century
Accounts of the American probate exception in the nineteenth
century went through two phases. In the antebellum period, the Court
adhered fairly closely to English ideas about the proper allocation of
probate authority between state probate courts and federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction over "suits" in "law and equity." Thus,
in 1827, the Court declared in Armstrong v. Lear 61 that state courts
exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction had the exclusive right to probate
a will of personal property. Justice Story wrote for the Court,
dismissing a case brought in a federal court of equity against an estate
administrator because the will had not yet been probated: 1 62
By the common law, the exclusive right to entertain jurisdiction over wills of personal
estate, belongs to the ecclesiastical Courts, and before any testamentary paper of
personalty can be admitted in evidence, it must receive probate in those Courts....
[T]he probate of wills of personalty to belong exclusively to the proper [probate] Court
here, exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 163

A few years later the Court reiterated that the "courts of the United
States have no probate jurisdiction" in Fouvergne v. City of New
Orleans, holding that state probate court decisions on the validity of a
157.

REPPY & TOMPKINS, supra note 128, at 148.

158. Id.
159. See id. at 148-49 (describing the role of Chancery in bringing estate administrators to
account).
160. Id. To be sure, some cases suggest that courts of equity had no power to set aside a will
once it had been established in ecclesiastical court because parties could always obtain adequate
relief in another forum. See, e.g., Kerrich v. Bransby, (1727) 3 Eng. Rep. 284, 286 (H.L.) (casting
doubt on Chancery's power to entertain a will contest).

161. 25 U.S. 169 (1827).
162. Id. at 175-76.
163. Id.

2014]

IN SEARCH OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION

1569

will are conclusive and that challenges to such findings must be
brought in state, not federal, court. 164
Neither of these cases specified the reason that federal courts
were incompetent to hear probate matters, and neither expressly
invoked constitutional limits. But one can see at least three ideas at
work in these early accounts: that federal courts lack ecclesiastical
jurisdiction; that federal courts have been limited by statute to suits
in law and equity; and that federal courts, applying principles of
federalism, should defer to state court primacy. Truthfully, the
antebellum jurist may have believed all three ideas to be self-evident.
Later cases certainly make clear that the exclusive nature of probate
jurisdiction could just as easily arise from the technical limitations on
the powers of courts of equity as from the lack of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction or the perceived primacy of state law.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Court
introduced a new element into its account of the probate exception.
Rather than the limits of equity or lessons of federalism, the Court
came to emphasize the distinction between the "controversies" or inter
partes disputes that were proper for federal adjudication and the sort
of ex parte or administrative work that federal courts could not
undertake in probate matters. Consider Gaines v. Fuentes,165 which
arose from the attempted removal to federal court of a state suit
concerning the validity of a Louisiana landowner's will.166 In
explaining why removal was proper, the Court explained that:
The Constitution imposes no limitation upon the class of cases involving controversies
between citizens of different States, to which the judicial power of the United States
may be extended; and Congress may, therefore, lawfully provide for bringing, at the
option of either of the parties, all such controversies within the jurisdiction of the
Federal judiciary. 167

There are, it is true, in several decisions of this court, expressions of opinion that the
Federal courts have no probate jurisdiction, referring particularly to the establishment
of wills; and such is undoubtedly the case under the existing legislation of Congress. The
reason lies in the nature of the proceeding to probate a will as one in rem, which does

164. 59 U.S. 470, 473 (1855) (citing Tarver v. Tarver, 34 U.S. 174, 179-80 (1835), which
earlier had supported the same proposition by reference to Armstrong v. Lear). Later still, a
decedent's next of kin challenged the issuance of letters of administration by a state probate
court in a federal equity proceeding. See Caujolle v. Ferri6, 80 U.S. 465, 465 (1871). The Court
dismissed the challenge, holding that federal courts sitting in equity were bound by the
determinations of a state probate court on the matter of who should administer an estate, resting
the decision on the fact that such actions by an ecclesiastical court in England would be binding
on English chancery courts. See id. at 473-74.
165. 92 U.S. 10, 10 (1875).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 18.
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not necessarily involve any controversy between parties: indeed, in the majority of
instances, no such controversy exists.... [B]ut whenever a controversy in a suit
between such parties arises respecting the validity or construction of a will, or the
enforcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there is no more reason why the Federal
courts should not take jurisdiction of the case than there is that they should not take
jurisdiction of any other controversy between the parties. 168

These passages by Justice Stephen Field convey two important ideas:
that the power of the federal courts extends to any controversy or
dispute between diverse parties, even where it happens to involve the
validity of a will, and that the proceedings at the core of the probate
exception were those of a nonadversarial character. 169
Subsequent cases echo Justice Field's idea that the exception
applies to the nonadversary or administrative quality of probate
proceedings. Consider the account in Ellis v. Davis:
Jurisdiction as to wills, and their probate as such, is neither included in nor excepted
out of the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United States. So far as it is ex
parte and merely administrative, it is not conferred and cannot be exercised by them at
all until, in a case at law or in equity, its exercise becomes necessary to settle a
controversy of which a court of the United States may take cognizance by reason of the
citizenship of the parties. 170

168. Id. at 21-22.
169. The majority in Gaines implied that any exception to federal jurisdiction in matters of
probate was statutory, but Justice Bradley in dissent was far more specific, declaring that the
statutory grant of federal diversity jurisdiction extended only to suits in law and equity, and that
probate matters were not included in this grant because they were resolved in ecclesiastical
courts, not those of law or equity:
Now, the phrase, "suits at common law and in equity," . . . must be construed to
embrace all litigations between party and party which in the English system of
jurisprudence, under the light of which the Judiciary Act, as well as the Constitution,
was framed, were embraced in all the various forms of procedure carried on in the
ordinary law and equity courts, as distinguished from the ecclesiastical, admiralty,
and military courts of the realm. The matters litigated in these extraordinary courts
are not, by a fair construction of the Judiciary Act, embraced in the terms "suit at law
or in equity,"....
This court has in repeated instances expressly said that the probate
of wills and the administration of estates do not belong to the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts under the grant of jurisdiction contained in the Judiciary Act; and it
may, without qualification, be stated, that no respectable authority, in the profession
or on the bench, has ever contended for any such jurisdiction. . . . The controversy is
not of that sort or nature which belongs to the category of a suit at law or in equity, as
those terms were used in the Judiciary Act.
Id. at 24-25 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley was careful to say that contested probate
proceedings could constitutionally be removed to federal court should Congress pass a new
statute conferring diversity jurisdiction over controversies without the law and equity
restriction. Id.:
Whether, after a will is proposed for probate, and a caveat has been put in against it,
and a contestatio litis has thus been raised, and a controversy instituted inter partes,
Congress might not authorize the removal of the cause for trial to a Federal court,
where the parties pro and con are citizens of different States, is not now the question.
The question before us is, whether Congress has ever done so; and it seems to me that
it has not.
170. 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883).
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The Ellis Court thus confirmed that the federal judiciary could hear
any inter partes dispute, so long as the statutory diversity
requirements were met. At the same time, the Court specified that the
"original" or "preliminary" probate must occur in a state court because
controversies could arise only over rights flowing from a will, rights
that did not exist until created by a grant of probate in state court
that often, and perhaps typically, resulted from an ex parte
proceeding. 171
By far the most provocative articulation of the ex parte account
of the probate exception appears in Byers v. McAuley, a decision in
which the Court overturned a lower federal court's decision to impose
equitable administration on the estate of a decedent. 172 The Court
recognized that federal courts have power to perform comparable
administrative chores when they oversee equitable receiverships to
restructure the affairs of a corporation for the benefit of creditors.
Such receiverships, though predicated on a diverse-party dispute,
were understood as empowering the court to take control of the
property of the debtor corporation as a res and to exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over the claims of nondiverse parties. But, as the Court
explained, such an expansive view of federal equity did not extend to
decedents' estates:
[In an equity receivership,] [p]ossession of the res draws to the court having possession
all controversies concerning the res. If original jurisdiction of the estates of deceased
persons were in the federal court, it might, by instituting such an administration, and
taking possession of the estate through an administrator appointed by it, draw to itself
all controversies affecting that estate . . . . But it has no original jurisdiction in respect
to the administration of a deceased person. It did not, in this case, assume to take
possession of the estate in the first instance; and it cannot, by entertaining jurisdiction
of a suit against the administrator, draw to itself the full possession of the estate, or the
power of determining all claims against it. 173

For the Byers Court, the power to administer decedents' estates
derives from the power to appoint the administrator in the initial,
often ex parte, proceeding to admit the will to probate. If,
hypothetically, the federal courts were given original jurisdiction over

171. Id.:
The original probate, of course, is mere matter of state regulation, and depends
entirely upon the local law; for it is that law which confers the power of making wills,
and prescribes the conditions upon which alone they may take effect; and as, by the
law in all the states, no instrument can be effective as a will until proved, no rights in
relation to it, capable of being contested between parties, can arise until preliminary
probate has been first made.
See also O'Callaghan v. O'Brien, 199 U.S. 89, 110 (1905) (distinguishing pure probate from inter
partes proceedings).
172. 149 U.S. 608 (1893).
173. Id. at 619.
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the initial probate application, the Court suggests that they could
probate the will and oversee the administration. But lacking the
power to hear the initial petition under jurisdictional grants that
encompass only state-law controversies and confer no original federal
probate jurisdiction, federal courts cannot take over the
administrative duties from the state courts. Simple rules of equitable
priority require federal deference. 174
The Court's focus on the administrative quality of the initial
probate application helps to explain why it rejected federal judicial
power over probate estates and yet agreed to exercise a similar power
in the context of equity receiverships. On the surface, the two
proceedings bear some resemblance; both involve matters of state law
and the exercise of administrative judicial power. But the typical
equitable receivership began as a bill in equity, brought by a creditor
against a debtor corporation. Federal jurisdiction was thus based not
on the submission of an ex parte petition for probate and
administration but on the presence of a dispute between diverse
citizens.17 5 The receivership, if one was imposed, was viewed as an
equitable remedy; instead of execution on the property of the debtor,
the receivership operated much like a debtor-in-possession bankruptcy
proceeding in which the firm remained intact, its obligations were
restructured, and the pain was shared among stakeholders. While the
administrative processes were similar, the equity receivership began
with a controversy, whereas the probate proceeding began with an ex
parte application for proof of the will.
In drawing this distinction, the Byers Court gave voice to
principles very much in keeping with our own conception of the power
of federal courts to exercise noncontentious jurisdiction. As to matters
of federal law, Congress has power to convey administrative or
noncontentious jurisdiction on the federal court to hear ex parte
"cases," such as the naturalization petitions upheld in Tutun.
Administrative power also extends on an ancillary or incidental basis
to remedial matters that arise in the course of proceedings otherwise
properly before the federal court, such as equity receiverships. But so
long as state law continues to govern the effectiveness of a will, initial
power to admit wills to probate remains a matter for state judicial
administration, and federal courts have no role to play. It takes a
controversy to ground the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
174. On the rules of equitable priority as they developed in the context of federal-state
concurrent jurisdiction, see James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the
Problem ofFederal-StateJurisdictionalOverlap, 92 TEx. L. REV. 1, 1-73 (2013).
175. On the power of the federal courts to hear friendly equitable receivership petitions, see
In re Reisenberg, 208 U.S. 90, 107 (1908). See generally Pfander & Birk, supra note 23.
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matters of state law. Neither Congress nor the state legislatures can
assign the federal courts original jurisdiction over ex parte
applications for the initiation of probate proceedings governed by state
law. 176
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE PROBATE EXCEPTION TODAY

Having proposed a new account of the probate exception as an
Article III limit on the power of federal courts to entertain original ex
parte applications for relief based upon state law, we consider recent
decisional law. While our account certainly differs in important
respects from that of the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Marshall, it
would not likely produce a substantial change in the way federal
courts have been handling probate issues. Indeed, the lessons of our
approach apply most directly to what Congress can and cannot assign
to the federal judiciary, and more indirectly to existing statutes that
confer (or have been interpreted to confer) only limited power on the
federal judiciary. We begin this Part with a sketch of Marshall and
then take up issues that have divided the lower federal courts.
177
The Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Marshall v. Marshall
shows some signs of the judicial minimalism for which the Roberts
Court has become known. Avoiding the question whether the probate
exception applied to matters brought within the federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Court focused instead on the
narrow scope of the probate exception. It began by restating its view
that federal courts have no statutory diversity jurisdiction to probate
or annul a will, administer a decedent's estate, or otherwise "dispose
of property that is in the custody of a state probate court." 178 The
176. We thus disagree, in part, with the view of Judge Posner in Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub.
Guardian,508 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2007), that:
the modern understanding is that the exception, except insofar as it bars the federal
courts from entertaining nonadversary proceedings, such as the uncontested
appointment of a guardian or the uncontested probate of a will, which are not cases or
controversies within the meaning of Article III, is based on a pragmatic interpretation
of the statutes that give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases at law and in equity.
We believe such non-adversary matters could be cases, but not controversies.
177. 547 U.S. 293 (2006).
178. Id. at 311-12. As for the Marshall Court's suggestion that the power of a federal court
does not extend to suits between diverse parties that seek to annul a will, consider Gaines v.
Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 20 (1875). The Gaines Court squarely held that the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts extended to the removal of a "suit" brought in state court to annul a will "as a
muniment of title, and to limit the operation of the decree admitting it to probate." Id. As the
Court explained:
[W]henever a controversy in a suit between such parties arises respecting the validity
or construction of a will, or the enforcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there
is no more reason why the Federal courts should not take jurisdiction of the case than
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Court also refused to credit the state's determination of the exclusivity
of its own jurisdiction, reaffirming its earlier holdings that federal
jurisdiction can "not be impaired by subsequent state legislation
creating courts of probate."1 79 Recognizing that the case at hand did
not "involve the administration of an estate, the probate of a will, or
any other purely probate matter," the Court permitted the assertion of
federal jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court.180 It explained its
previously stated concern with "interference" as "a reiteration of the
general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction
over a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the
same res."181 This principle of deference to prior custody explains why
federal courts cannot "dispose of property that is in the custody of a
state probate court." 182 In Marshall, however, the tort claim did not
threaten the probate court's custody but only sought to impose in
personam liability on the beneficiary of the estate.
Our approach would not call for a different result in Marshall.
To be sure, the Marshall Court based the probate exception entirely
on statutory grounds, 183 and we regard the exception as rooted in
Article III of the Constitution. But the Marshall case did not implicate
the constitutional limits we have identified. It was an inter partes
dispute over tortious interference with a promised bequest and thus
clearly satisfied the requirements of party adverseness. Everyone
agreed that the initial submission of the will to probate was a subject
for the Texas state court to handle. In the absence of any attempt on
the part of the federal court to exercise jurisdiction over an ex parte
proceeding grounded in state law, the probate exception as we have
defined it does not come into play. We therefore would agree that the
dispute's implication of the estate of a wealthy decedent did not oust
the federal bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. While we believe that
there is that they should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy between the
parties.
Id. at 22. As Marshall observed, however, the Gaines decision was apparently limited by later
cases that treated a suit to annul as supplemental to the probate court's power to establish the
will. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 311 (citing Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 208 (1918)). Yet both
Gaines and Sutton were decided at a time when the Court looked to the structure of state court
proceedings to define the scope of the district court's inter partes authority. Having correctly
concluded that state law cannot oust a district court of its diversity jurisdiction over a genuine
dispute, the Court should not give much weight to the Sutton Court's finding that Texas did not
permit inter partes disputes to annul a will.
179. Marshall,547 U.S. at 312-14.
180. Id. at 312 (quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. at 311.
182. Id. at 312.
183. See id. at 308-09 (linking probate exception to federal jurisdiction to language in
Judiciary Act of 1789).
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Congress, having properly federalized the law of probate, could assign
probate matters to federal courts for administration as "cases," we do
not believe that the existing federal bankruptcy statute purports to
make such an assignment.
We thus believe that Congress retains a great deal of control
over the scope of the probate exception, notwithstanding our view that
it has roots in the Constitution. And so long as Congress chooses to
defer to the state role in probate matters, state court primacy in the
administration of the probate estate will do much of the work in
defining the practical work-a-day scope of the probate exception. The
Court has long required the federal courts to tailor their decrees in
diverse-party disputes so as to respect the primacy of the state courts
in overseeing probate administration. That was the message of
Markham v. Allen.18 4 After placing the probate exception on statutory
grounds, the Court added that federal courts do have "jurisdiction to
entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs, and other
claimants against a decedent's estate to establish their claims so long
as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or
assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in
custody of state court."1 85 In warding off federal "control of the
property in custody of a state court," the Court appears to have built
on its earlier in rem analogy in an effort to protect the state's primacy
in the administration of estates governed by state law.
A second, and more fundamental, difference may separate our
approach from that of the Marshall Court. We think Congress has
power to authorize the federal courts to entertain a claim based on
state law to annul a will, so long as the requisite diversity of
citizenship appears between opposing parties. 186 Consider suits to
annul a will for fraud. Marshall was at pains to exclude such matters
from federal cognizance, doing so on the basis of statutory
considerations that enjoy a measure of historical support. After all,
while equity generally entertained fraud claims of all sorts, a wellestablished rule prevented equity from taking jurisdiction of such
claims in connection with disputes over the validity of wills. Joseph
Story explained the rule as follows:

184. 326 U.S. 490 (1946).
185. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Suits to annul a will can arise as diverse-party controversies and should, on our theory,
qualify for federal adjudication. That's the message of cases from the nineteenth century. See
supra Part III.
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In certain cases, as of fraud in obtaining a will, whether of personal estate or real estate,
the proper remedy is exclusively vested in other Courts; in wills of personal estate in the
Ecclesiastical Courts, in wills of real estate in the Courts of Common Law. 187

To the extent that one views the probate exception as an outgrowth of
the limits of equity, in short, one can readily understand why suits to
annul a will for fraud were thought to lie beyond the statutory power
of federal courts vested with diversity jurisdiction over suits "in law
and equity." The Marshall Court thus adopted an understandable
version of an established rule in choosing to treat suits to annul a will
as beyond the diversity jurisdiction statute as currently framed. 188
However well supported as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Marshall Court's view of federal power over suits
to annul a will has little foundation in Article III. (We suspect the
Marshall Court would agree, having concluded that the exception
rests on statutory grounds that Congress can modify.) Notably, as
Judge Weinstein observed in Spindel v. Spindel, the controversy bases
of jurisdiction in Article III contain no "law and equity" restriction. 189
So long as the suit to annul satisfies the elements of diversity as a
"controversy" between citizens of different states, it would seem to
qualify for federal jurisdiction under Article III. On this view,
Congress could, if it chose, expand the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts to encompass will contests between contending parties
from different states. We certainly do not advocate such an expansion;
as a matter of policy, we tend to support restrictions in the scope of
diversity jurisdiction, rather than expansions. We simply sketch the
possibility as way of highlighting the difference, small but significant,
between the broader, statutory probate exception defined in Marshall
v. Marshall and the narrower, constitutional exception that we see as
implicit in the idea of a controversy.
With this background in place, we can now turn to the
questions that have divided lower federal courts in the wake of
Marshall.190 On the first question, whether the probate exception

187.

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN

ENGLAND AND AMERICA 194 (1836). On reviewing Story and other authorities, Professor
Langbein accordingly concluded that, when the claim was fraud, "the Chancery was without
authority to determine the validity of the execution of a will." John H. Langbein, FactFinding in
the English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620, 1623 (1974).
188. See Marshall,547 U.S. at 311-12.
189. See 283 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
190. One question, whether the probate exception applies to claims under federal law, the
Court deliberately sidestepped. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308 ("Federal jurisdiction in this case
is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the statute vesting in federal district courts jurisdiction in
bankruptcy cases and related proceedings.").
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applies to cases arising under federal law, 191 we think the answer is
mixed. As we noted in Part II, the principle of coextensivity suggests
that the Court has the power to oversee on appeal all violations of
federal law that occur in connection with state probate proceedings.
What's more, we believe that Congress has the power, if it chooses to
federalize the law of probate, to assign the ex parte chores of probate
and administration to the federal judiciary. Federal noncontentious
jurisdiction extends to "cases" under Article 111.192 But we do not think
that most current federal jurisdictional statutes should be interpreted
as conferring original jurisdiction on the federal district courts to
conduct pure probate proceedings. Those statutes, unlike the
naturalization laws and other sources of original noncontentious
federal jurisdiction, provide for the resolution of contentious disputes
between adverse parties. We see little basis for concluding that these
laws seek to displace state court administration of probate estates. 193
In a second post-Marshall puzzle, federal courts have divided
in their analysis of the probate exception's application to claims
relating to the administration of an inter vivos trust and other "will
substitutes."1 9 4 Tackling that problem in Oliver v. Hines, 195 one
district court emphasized the Court's narrow view of the probate
exception:
[T]he thrust of the Marshall decision makes clear that the scope of the probate exception
is limited to actual probate matters. The Supreme Court rejected the repeated

191. Compare In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the probate
exception does not apply to federal question jurisdiction), with Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304,
307 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.) (holding that the probate exception does apply to federal
jurisdiction), and In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds,
Marshall,547 U.S. at 311 (extending the probate exception to federal question cases).
192. One might wonder if Congress could simply confer probate jurisdiction on the federal
courts so that any claim for probate would arise under the grant of jurisdiction. We think such a
jurisdictional statute would run afoul of the principle that cases arise under federal law only
when a federal question "forms an ingredient of the original cause." See Osborn v. Bank of U.S.,
22 U.S. (9. Wheat) 738, 823 (1824). Jurisdictional grants alone do not supply the requisite
ingredient. See, e.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1989) (construing the federal
officer removal statute to confer jurisdiction only when the official raises a substantive federal
question). For an account of protective jurisdiction, see James E. Pfander, ProtectiveJurisdiction,
Aggregate Litigation,and the Limits of Article III, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2007).
193. Thus, a Kentucky federal bankruptcy court assumed that the probate exception applied
with equal force to bankruptcy proceedings and blocked the approval of a settlement agreement
that contained a provision nullifying a will, citing Marshall for the proposition that federal
courts cannot annul a will. See In re Brown, 484 B.R. 322, 330-32 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2012).
194. Compare Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
probate exception does not apply to trust property because that property never came under the
control of a probate court), with Evans v. Pearson Enters., Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that refusing to hear cases regarding "will substitutes" is consistent with the probate
exception).
195. 943 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Va. 2013).
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expansion of the exception to matters that were merely ancillary to probate. An inter
vivos trust is not a will, and although it may, on occasion, serve as the functional
equivalent of a will, the application of the probate exception to such trusts would mark
an unwarranted expansion of the exception. 196

While acknowledging that inter vivos trusts and other legal devices
may be the functional equivalent of wills that the probate exception
would prevent federal courts from adjudicating, Oliver permitted
federal jurisdiction because the trust was not technically a will. 197 We
agree with this reading of Marshall and simply add that we would not
expect the probate exception to apply to a genuine controversy unless
litigation over an inter vivos trust were to begin with an initial ex
parte application to a state court that sought to prove or establish the
trust.
A similarly narrow view of the exception emerges from a series
of inter partes disputes over assets claimed by or from a probate
estate. In United States v. Tyler, the Third Circuit found that federal
jurisdiction extended to an action to recover tax revenue from the sale
of a decedent's property, notwithstanding that the property was under
the administration of a state probate court.198 The "judgment was not
against any res held by the state probate court; it was a judgment in
personam ... to pay the government its share of the proceeds." 199
Similarly, in Curtis v. Brunsting, the Fifth Circuit held that the
probate exception did not apply to a living trust because trusts were
not part of the decedent's estate at the time of death and therefore
never came under the in rem jurisdiction of a state probate court. 200
Probate exception decisions in other circuits have similarly turned on
whether a state probate court already had control over the property at
the center of the dispute, even if those cases do not use the vocabulary

196. Id. at 638.
197. Id. But see Chabot v. Chabot, No. 4:11-CV-217-BLW, 2011 WL 5520927, at *4 (D. Idaho
2011) (concluding that "the probate exception analysis applies to trusts that act as will
substitutes"); Leskinen v. Halsey, No. CV 12-623(JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 802915 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
2013) (broadly interpreting the probate exception as intended to prohibit federal involvement in
the administration of decedents' estates).
198. United States v. Tyler, 528 Fed. App'x 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2013).
199. Id.
200. Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d 406, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2013):
However, nothing suggests that the Texas probate court currently has custody or in
rem jurisdiction over the Trust. It likely does not. Assets placed in an inter vivos trust
generally avoid probate, since such assets are owned by the trust, not the decedent,
and therefore are not part of the decedent's estate. In other words, because the assets
in a living or inter vivos trust are not property of the estate at the time of the
decedent's death, having been transferred to the trust years before, the trust is not in
the custody of the probate court and as such the probate exception is inapplicable to
disputes concerning administration of the trust.
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of in rem jurisdiction. 2 01 Finally, in Lefkowitz v. Bank of New York, 202
the Second Circuit acknowledged that Marshallnarrowed the scope of
the probate exception. 203 The court accordingly blocked jurisdiction
over claims that would wrest control of property from state probate
courtS2 04 but allowed claims that did not directly interfere with a state
court's possession, including those that "undoubtedly intertwine with
the litigation proceeding in the probate courts." 20 5 Overlapping and
duplicative adversary proceedings, even those that happen to grow out
of a decedent's estate, do not fall within the probate exception.
V. CONCLUSION

Our search has turned up a probate exception in an unlikely
corner of Article III. While the judicial power in federal question
"cases" extends broadly to encompass both contentious and
noncontentious forms of jurisdiction, the judicial power in
"controversies" has a more limited sweep. Both the textual reference
to "controversies" in the Constitution and the practice of the federal
courts confirm that federal power in diversity extends only to the
resolution of disputes between adverse parties that meet the
alignment requirements of Article III. As a result, Congress cannot
assign, and the federal courts cannot exercise, noncontentious or ex
parte jurisdiction over matters of administration grounded in state
law.
Such an account of the probate exception explains much but
should not unsettle federal practice. Federal courts retain broad

201. The First and Seventh Circuits have each held that federal courts may adjudicate
claims that will add to an estate in probate without running afoul of the probate exception
because such a dispute does not require a federal court to usurp control over property already
under the control of a state probate court. See Jimenez v. Rodriguez-Pagan, 597 F.3d 18, 24 (1st
Cir. 2010) ("Indeed, the very relief sought here is enlargement of the decedent's estate through
assets not currently within it. While divvying up an estate falls squarely within the probate
exception, merely increasing it does not."); Gustafson v. zumBrunnen, 546 F.3d 398, 400 (7th Cir.
2008):
The suit, though based ultimately on the will, is not within the probate exception to
federal jurisdiction. The judgment sought would just add assets to the decedent's
estate; it would not reallocate the estate's assets among contending claimants or
otherwise interfere with the probate court's control over and administration of the
estate.
202. 528 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2007).
203. Id. at 105 ("Before Marshall,most federal courts, including ours, had interpreted the
probate exception more broadly than the Supreme Court has now defined it."); see Moser v.
Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing a conjunctive test used to determine whether
application of the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction is appropriate).
204. Lefkowitz, 528 F.3d at 107.
205. Id. at 107-08.
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federal question jurisdiction over both contentious and noncontentious
matters and can oversee all disputed federal issues that arise in the
course of state court probate proceedings. Congress also retains broad
power to regulate and to assign cases arising from such regulation to
the federal courts, in keeping with the doctrine of coextensivity. But to
the extent that Congress leaves matters of probate to state law, it
cannot enlist the federal courts in the administration of applications
to probate a will. While we would narrowly interpret this exception to
federal judicial power, we regard it as a small but significant reminder
that Article III reserves a role for the state courts in our federal
system.

